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ADAM M. GERSHOWITZ 
NUMBER 1 
Almost everyone agrees that indigent defense in America is under-
funded, but workable solutions have been hard to come by. For the most 
part, courts have been unwilling to inject themselves into legislative budget 
decisions. And, when courts have become involved and issued favorable 
decisions, the benefits have been only temporary because once the 
pressure of litigation disappears so does a legislature's desire to 
appropriate more funding. This Article proposes that if an indigent 
defense system is under-funded, the state supreme court should impose a 
default rule raising the standard of proof to "beyond all doubt" to convict 
indigent defendants. The legislature would then have the opportunity to 
opt out of this higher standard of proof by providing enough funding to 
bring defense lawyers ' caseloads within well-recognized standards or by 
providing funding parity with prosecutors' offices. Such an approach will 
create an incentive for legislatures to adequately fund indigent defense 
without miring courts in detailed supervision of legislative budget 
decisions. At the same time, because courts can check once per year to 
determine whether there is funding parity with prosecutors ' offices or 
compliance with caseload guidelines, there will be constant pressure on 
legislatures to maintain adequate funding in order to avoid the higher 
standard of proof 
85 
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Raise the Proof: 
A Default Rule for Indigent Defense 
ADAM M. GERSHOWITZ• 
I. INTRODUCJ'ION 
Indigent defense in America is woefully under-funded. 1 Due to a lack 
of resources, many public defenders are forced to carry hundreds of cases, 
far in excess of recommended standards. 2 Jurisdictions that appoint 
lawyers on an individual basis often pay them trifles to defend serious 
felonies. 3 And to add insult to injury, defense lawyers in many 
jurisdictions are paid substantially less than their prosecutor counterparts.4 
Each year, the states spend more than $5 billion on prosecuting criminal 
cases, plus additional billions of dollars on police and crime labs that are 
used to assist prosecutors, compared with less than $3 billion for indigent 
defense.5 
The results of under-funding indigent defense are not surprising.6 Poor 
' Assistant Professor of Law, South Texas College of Law. I am grateful to Stephanos Bibas, 
Toby Heytens, Randy Kelso, Erik Lillquist, Paul Marcus, Usha Rodrigues, and Ron Wright for helpful 
comments, and to Matthew Cavenaugh, Elizabeth Drought, and Monica Ortale for research assistance. 
1 For the most comprehensive in a long line of articles chronicling the under-funding of indigent 
defense and its consequences, see Mary Sue Backus & Paul Marcus, The Right to Counsel in Criminal 
Cases, A National Crisis, 57 HASTINGS L.J. 1031 (2006). 
2 See, e.g., Stephen B. Bright, Neither Equal Nor Just: The Rationing and Denial of Legal 
Services to the Poor When Life and Liberty Are at Stake, 1997 ANN. SURV. AM. L. 783,816 (discussing 
the lack of funding for public defender programs). 
3 See, e.g., Stephen B. Bright, Counsel for the Poor: The Death Sentence Not for the Worst Crime 
but for the Worst Lawyer, 103 YALE L.J. 1835, 1853-55 (1994)(analyzing the law fees paid to lawyers 
in capital cases); Norman Lefstein, In Search of Gideon's Promise: Lessons from England and the 
Need for Federal Help, 55 HASTINGS L.J. 835, 847-48 (2004) (discussing divergence in fees paid to 
private attorneys who represent the government as opposed to indigent defendants). 
4 See, e.g., Scott Wallace, Parity: The Fail Safe Standard, in I U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, 
COMPENDIUM OF STANDARDS FOR INDIGENT DEFENSE SYSTEMS: STANDARDS FOR ADMINISTRATION 
OF DEFENSE SYSTEMS 13, 16 (2000), available at 
http://www.ojp.usdoj .gov/indigentdefense/compendiurn!pdftxt/voll. pdf ("Salary parity remains the 
exception rather than the rule, among smaller programs."); THE SPANGENBERG GROUP, A 
COMPREHENSIVE REVIEW OF INDIGENT DEFENSE IN VIRGINIA 34 (2004) available at 
http://www.abanet.org/legalservices/downloads/sclaid/indigentdefense/va-report2004.pdf [hereinafter 
VIRGINIA REPORT] ("Average pay in the offices is $64,000 for [prosecutors] and $46,000 for assistant 
public defenders."). 
s STANDING COMM. ON LEGAL AID & INDIGENT DEFENDANTS, AM. BAR Ass'N, GIDEON'S 
BROKEN PROMISE: AMERICA'S CONTINUING QUEST FOR EQUAL JUSTICE 13-14 (2004), 
available at http://www.abanet.org/legalservices/sclaid/defenderlbrokenpromise/fullreport.pdf 
[hereinafter GIDEON'S BROKEN PROMISE]. 
6 Scholars have recognized that most problems with indigent defense systems stem from the lack 
of funding. See Bright, supra note 2, at 816 (''The most fundamental reason for the poor quality or 
HeinOnline  -- 40 Conn. L. Rev. 88 2007-2008
88 CONNECTICUT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 40:85 
defendants receive inadequate representation, wrongful convictions occur, 
longer prison terms are meted out to indigent defendants, and confidence in 
the criminal justice system is decimated. 7 In short, unlike other areas of 
law, everyone is in agreement: the under-funding of indigent defense is a 
serious problem. 8 
There is no shortage of proposals for dealing with the problem. The 
American Bar Association and legal scholars have advocated requiring 
funding parity between prosecutors and defense lawyers.9 White-shoe law 
firms have brought litigation that demands increased funding, removal of 
caps on the fees paid to appointed lawyers, and judicial supervision of the 
criminal justice system. 10 Still other observers have suggested making it 
easier to establish ineffective assistance of counsel on post-conviction 
review. 11 
Unfortunately, while some of these efforts had initial success, the 
improvements were short-term and already have dissipated. 12 And the 
successes have been the exception, not the rule. More often than not, 
absence of legal services for the poor in the criminal justice system is the refusal of governments to 
allocate sufficient funds for indigent defense programs."); Dennis E. Curtis & Judith Resnik, Grieving 
Criminal Defense Lawyers, 70 FORDHAM L. REV. 1615, 1620 (2002) ("Poor training, perverse 
incentives, and massive caseloads [among many other consequences] all stem from the lack of 
resources devoted to criminal defense."); Kyung M. Lee, Reinventing Gideon v. Wainwright: Holistic 
Defenders, Indigent Defendants, and the Right to Counsel, 31 AM. J. CRIM. L. 367, 373 (2004) 
("(F]unding is conceivably related to every other problem in indigent defense."). 
7 See Note, Gideon's Promise Unfo/filled: The Need for Litigated Reform of Indigent Defense, 
113 HARV. L. REV. 2062, 2064 (2000) (describing the "systemic impact of the poor quality of indigent 
defense counsel") [hereinafter Gideon's Promise Unfulfilled]. 
8 See Lee, supra note 6, at 370 ("A survey of the literature unearths many scholars and 
practitioners criticizing, and lamenting, the state of indigent defense. Their conclusions are more or 
less the same: our indigent defense system is in a state of crisis."); William J. Stuntz, The Uneasy 
Relationship Between Criminal Procedure and Criminal Justice, 107 YALE L.J. I, 10 (1997) ("[T)hose 
familiar with the system agree that the story these numbers tell is generally true: Public defenders are 
terribly overburdened."). 
9 See ABA STANDING COMM. ON LEGAL AID & INDIGENT DEFENDANTS, ABA TEN PRINCIPLES 
OF A PuBLIC DEFENSE DELIVERY SYSTEM I (2002) available at 
http://www.abanet.org!legalservices/downloads/sclaid/indigentdefense/tenprinciplesbooklet.pdf 
(''There [should be] parity between defense counsel and the prosecution with respect to 
resources .... "); Ronald F. Wright, Parity of Resources for Defense Counsel and the Reach of Public 
Choice Theory, 90 IOWA L. REv. 219 (2004) (arguing for resource parity, but suggesting it may come 
from legislative action without court intervention); Wallace, supra note 4, at 14 ("The U.S. Department 
of Justice endorsed the concept of parity in the same year that Gideon v. Wainwright was handed 
down.") (internal emphasis added). 
10 See infra Part II (discussing the difference in spending between prosecutors and indigent 
defense attorneys). 
11 See State v. Peart, 621 So. 2d 780, 784 (La. 1993) (shifting burden to government to rebut 
presumption of ineffectiveness); Rebecca Kunkel, Note, Equalizing the Right to Counsel, 18 GEO. J. 
LEGAL ETHICS 843, 858 (2005) (considering whether the government should bear the burden of 
proving effective assistance of counsel); Russell L. Weaver, The Perils of Being Poor: Indigent 
Defense and Effective Assistance, 42 BRANDEIS L.J. 435,437 (2003-2004) (reviewing the standards of 
review applied in ineffective assistance cases). 
12 See Note, Effectively Ineffective: The Failure of Courts to Address Underfunded Indigent 
Defense Systems, 118 HARv. L. REv. 1731, 1736 (2005) [hereinafter Effectively Ineffective] ("[T)hese 
decisions have ultimately had less of a practical, sustainable impact than many had hoped."). 
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reform efforts have won praise from local newspaper editorials, but failed 
to convince the judiciary to intervene. 13 In refusing to get involved, courts 
have pointed to abstention doctrine, separation of powers concerns, and the 
general fear that courts should not be in the business of micromanaging 
legislative budget decisions. 14 
The challenge, therefore, is to offer a reform proposal that steers clear 
of courts' concerns about micro-management and over-reaching. To effect 
sustainable change, the judiciary should not, by itself, attempt to fix 
foundering indigent defense systems. Rather, the courts should seek to 
motivate the legislatures to fix the problem by imposing an unattractive 
default rule that will operate in the absence of legislative action. 15 The 
default rule should be simple, bright-line, and unequivocally within the 
province of the judiciary. Such criteria eliminate the most common 
proposals for remedying the indigent defense crisis, such as the suggestion 
that courts undertake the traditionally legislative task of ordering the 
expenditure of particular sums of money. 16 Similarly, proposals that 
involve long-term judicial monitoring of indigent defense systems are 
neither bright-line rules nor, as experience has taught, simple. 17 
There is an easier way. A bright-line and classically judicial solution 
would be for courts facing under-funded indigent defense systems to create 
a default rule raising the standard of proof in all criminal cases against 
indigent defendants. Rather than the traditional "beyond a reasonable 
doubt" standard, the prosecution would shoulder the burden to prove 
indigent defendants guilty under a higher "beyond all doubt" standard. 
Because the "beyond all doubt" standard of proof would be a default rule, 
legislatures would be free to opt out if they adequately fund their indigent 
defense systems. To keep matters simple, legislatures could demonstrate 
adequate funding in either of two (and only two) bright-line ways: (1) the 
caseloads of government-funded defense lawyers do not exceed the 
recommended guideposts set by the National Advisory Commission on 
13 Compare Editorial, Passing the Buck on Defendants' Rights, COMMERCIAL APPEAL, May 6, 
2003, at 84 (criticizing the lack of funding for Mississippi public defenders) with Quitman County v. 
Mississippi, 910 So.2d 1032 (Miss. 2005) (rejecting constitutional challenge to lack of state funding for 
indigent defense) . 
14 See infra notes 82-92 and accompanying text . 
IS See William J. Stuntz, The Political Constitution of Criminal Justice, 119 HARV. L. REV. 780, 
827 (2006) (discussing the concept of "a default rule that is unattractive by design, so that politicians 
have an incentive to pick an appropriate conduct rule themselves"). 
16 For an early article analyzing such judicial involvement, see Gerald E. Frug, The Judicial 
Power of the Purse, 126 U. PA. L. REv. 715 (1978). 
17 See Charles F. Sabel & William H. Simon, Destabilization Rights: How Public LAw Litigation 
Succeeds, 117 HARV. L. REv. lOIS, 1052 (2004) ("In all of these areas, though varying degrees, there 
has been a tendency for remedial practice to move away from command-and-control toward 
experimentalist methods.") . Scholars disagree about the extent to which courts are continuing to 
impose structural injunctions. For a helpful summary of the literature and an argument that such 
injunctions have not died, but rather become more focused, see Margo Schlanger, Civil Rights 
Injunctions Over Time: A Case Study of Jail and Prison Court Orders, 81 N.Y.U. L. REV. 550 (2006). 
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Criminal Justice Standards and Goals, or (2) the funds appropriated for 
indigent defense are equal to the funds appropriated for prosecutors' 
offices. 18 
Legislatures would be free to decide how to achieve either (or both) of 
these scenarios. They could appropriate more money for indigent defense, 
or they could encourage (or even require) prosecutors to charge fewer 
defendants, thus reducing the caseloads of government-funded defense 
lawyers. While the possibilities for implementation are numerous, the 
outcome should be predictable: prosecutors hostile to a higher standard of 
proof will lobby the legislature to ensure adequate indigent defense 
funding, and legislators seeking to be tough on crime will move quickly to 
ensure that an unnecessarily high standard of proof will not remain intact. 19 
Put simply, a default rule imposed by the judiciary will create a strong 
incentive for the key players in the criminal justice system to provide 
adequate funding for indigent defense. 
This Article begins with a brief overview of the under-funding of 
indigent defense in the United States and the massive problems it creates. 
Part ill then reviews the litigation efforts that have been made to solve the 
funding crisis. Part ill discusses why most of the proposals have failed 
outright or resulted only in short-term successes. Part IV then examines 
the traditional proof beyond a reasonable doubt standard and argues that it 
would be permissible for the Court to impose a higher standard in cases 
involving indigent defendants. Part V advocates that the higher standard of 
proof operate as a default rule. Legislatures could opt out of the higher 
standard of proof by ensuring that caseloads remain within accepted 
guidelines or by funding defense resources at the same level as prosecution 
resources. Part V explains that such a solution has the virtue of 
maximizing institutional competence. The proposal calls on the judiciary 
to serve its traditional function of imposing legal standards, while asking 
the legislature to fulfill its typical job of funding and implementing public 
policy. 
18 Other scholars have advocated variations of these proposals, though not as a default rule linked 
to a heightened standard of proof. See Wright, supra note 9 (arguing for resource parity but suggesting 
it may come from legislative action without court intervention); Gideon's Promise Unfolfilled, supra 
note 7, at 2073 (noting in passing that imposing the ABA caseload guidelines would require "little 
judicial inventiveness or lawmaking" and "would require little ongoing judicial management"). 
19 See William J. Stuntz, The Pathological Politics of Criminal Law, 100 MICH. L. REv. 505, 534 
(200 l) [hereinafter Stuntz, Pathological Politics] (explaining that "at the most basic level, elected 
legislators and elected prosecutors are natural allies. Both need to please voters in order to survive, and 
for both, pleasing voters means essentially the same thing: punishing people voters want to see 
punished"). 
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II. THE INDIGENT DEFENSE FUNDING CRISIS 
A. The Under-funding Problem 
There is no serious dispute that indigent defense is under-funded. As 
one commenter recently explained: "[S]tate and federal governments 
together allocate over half of their criminal justice spending to the 
investigation and prosecution of crimes but only about two percent to 
indigent defense."2° For instance, in 1998, the federal government spent 
nearly $5.5 billion to fund the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Drug 
Enforcement Administration, and the U.S. Attorneys' offices, but less than 
$400 million on indigent defense. 21 Matters at the state level are no better. 
In a typical year, the states spend more than $5 billion to prosecute 
criminal cases compared with less than $3 billion for indigent defense. 22 A 
2000 report by the Department of Justice concluded that indigent defense 
"is in a chronic state of crisis" in large part because "funding has not kept 
pace with other components of the criminal justice system. "23 
Unfortunately, the under-funding problem is national in scope. A 
review of Harris County, Texas-which has been the scene of legendary 
stories about sleeping and drunk lawyers 24 -revealed that the highly 
capable District Attorney's office spent $26 million in 1999, compared 
with $11.6 million for indigent defense. 25 In Louisiana, a recent study 
found that prosecutors outspent government-funded defense lawyers by a 
three-to-one margin, and those figures did not account for the extra support 
prosecutors receive from police investigators and state crime labs, which 
are funded separately.26 In 2000, Mississippi spent more than $16 million 
20 Lee, supra note 6, at 373. 
21 !d. 
22 GIDEON'S BROKEN PROMISE, supra note 5, at 13-14. As one noted observer has explained, 
"poor defendants receive only an eighth of the resources per case available to prosecutors." DEBORAH 
L. RHODE, ACCESS TO JUSTICE 123 (2004 ). 
23 NAT'L SYMPOSIUM ON INDIGENT DEFENSE, OFFICE OF JUSTICE PROGRAMS, IMPROVING 
CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEMS THROUGH ExPANDED STRATEGIES AND INNOVATIVE COLLABORATIONS, 
at ix (2000), available at www.ojp.usdoj.gov/indigentdefenselicjs.pdf. 
24 See, e.g., Paul M. Barrett, On the Defense: Lawyer's Fast Work on Death Cases Raises Doubts 
About System, WALL ST. J., Sept. 7, 1994, at AI, available at LEXIS, News Library, WSJNL File 
(describing the late Joe Frank Cannon, a lawyer in Harris County who repeatedly was appointed to 
handle capital cases even though he had ten separate clients sentenced to death and reportedly fell 
asleep during a number of their trials). 
25 Bob Sablatura, Study Confirms Money Counts in County Courts; Those Using Appointed 
Lawyers Are Twice as Likely to Serve Time, HOUS. CHRON., Oct. 17, 1999, at AI, available at LEXIS, 
News Library, HCHRN File. The imbalance is not quite as big as it appears, however. Throughout the 
United States, approximately 20% of criminal defendants hire private attorneys. See CAROLINE WOLF 
HARLOW, DEFENSE COUNSEL IN CRIMINAL CASES, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS 5 (2000), 
available at www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/abstract/dccc.htm (stating that 80% of felony defendants are 
indigent). Thus, while the District Attorney's office needs funding to prosecute I 00% of crimes, the 
indigent defense system only needs funding to defend 80% of the cases. Nevertheless, the funding 
difference in Harris County is still far out of balance. 
26 See NAT'L LEGAL AID & DEFENDER AsS'N, IN DEFENSE OF PUBLIC ACCESS TO JUSTICE: AN 
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to prosecute felony cases while less than $9 million was spent on indigent 
defense.27 As one observer recently detailed: 
As late as 2000, defenders in one Georgia county were paid 
an average of $49.86 per case. Indeed in some states, 
teenagers selling sodas on the beach can earn more than 
court- appointed counsel. In Wayne County, Michigan, 
assigned counsel made, after deducting overhead, $6 to $12 
per hour ... Minnesota's 386 full-time public defenders 
worked 35,000 unpaid overtime hours in 2002, essentially 
meaning that part-time lawyers worked full time, and full-
time lawyers worked nights and weekends to get the job 
done. 28 
While there have been improvements in certain localities, for many 
jurisdictions the situation is becoming worse. 29 The City of Pittsburgh cut 
funding for twelve of the city's fifty-seven public defenders even though 
the judge heading the criminal division had recommended against such 
cuts. 30 Due to budget shortfalls, Connecticut reduced funding for more 
than half of fifty-one attorneys and support staff that had recently been 
hired as part of a settlement to litigation challenging excessive caseloads.31 
In many jurisdictions, state governments contribute little or no money to 
indigent defense, requiring county governments to shoulder the entire 
burden themselves. 32 In counties with tight budgets, it is nearly impossible 
to find the necessary funding. 
B. The Results of Under-funding 
The most obvious problem caused by the under-funding of indigent 
defense is that jurisdictions cannot hire a sufficient number of lawyers, 
leaving existing staff with excessive caseloads. The excessive caseloads in 
ASSESSMENT OF TRIAL-LEVEL INDIGENT DEFENSE SERVICES IN LoUISIANA 40 YEARS AFTER GIDEON 
53 (2004) available at 
hnp://www.nlada.org/DMS/Documents/l 078863541.49/ Avoyelles%20Parsh%20Body%20Text. pdf 
[hereinafter IN DEFENSE OF PUBLIC ACCESS TO JUSTICE]; Catherine Beane, Gideon Shattered: Justice 
Stands Still in Avoyelles Parish, Louisiana, CHAMPION, Mar. 27, 2004, at *6, **8-9, available at 
LEXIS, News Library, CHAMP File. 
27 Erin V. Everett, Comment, Salvation Lies Within: Why the Mississippi Supreme Court Can and 
Should Step in to Solve Mississippi's Indigent Defense Crisis, 74 MISS. L.J. 213,219-20 (2004). 
28 Lee, supra note 6, at 375-76 {internal quotations and citations omitted). 
29 See, e.g., Stuntz, supra note 8, at 9-10 ("[S]pending on indigent defendants in constant dollars 
per case appears to have declined significantly between the late 1970s and the early 1990s."). 
30 See Bright, supra note 2, at 817 (citing Jan Ackerman, Public Defenders Feel Betrayed by 
Heavy-Handed County Axing, PITTSBURGH POST-GAZETTE, Feb. 27, 1996, at Bl, available at LEXIS, 
News Library, PSTGAZ File). 
31 Kellie A. Wagner, Advocates: States Not Rising to Call of Gideon, LEGAL INTEU.IGENCER, 
Mar. 18, 2003, available at WESTLAW, Legal News Library, TLI File. 
32 See, e.g., Everett, supra note 27, at 224 ("With the exception of death penalty cases, the State of 
Mississippi does not contribute one dollar towards the representation of poor defendants."). 
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tum lead to a host of additional problems. Because lawyers are 
overwhelmed, they lack the time to promptly meet with their clients, 
leaving indigent defendants to languish in jail for egregiously long periods 
of time without ever speaking to a lawyer. When lawyers do meet with 
their clients, they often pressure the defendants to plead guilty irrespective 
of the merits of the case because of the lack of time to prepare for and 
conduct a trial. Those defendants who do insist on proceeding to trial are 
handicapped with inexperienced, overwhelmed, or incompetent lawyers 
who lack the funds for basic litigation resources such as investigators and 
expert witnesses. The hurried plea bargains and rushed trials result in 
convictions of some factually innocent defendants and in harsher sentences 
than those meted out to comparable non-indigent defendants. As explained 
in more detail below, the under-funding of indigent defense pervades every 
step of the criminal justice process. 
1. Excessive Caseloads 
First, the lack of funding for indigent defense means that most public 
defenders (and many appointed counsel) are handling excessive 
caseloads. 33 The National Advisory Commission on Criminal Justice 
Standards and Goals-a national body established by the Department of 
Justice to implement recommendations from the President's 1968 Crime 
Commission-has recommended that public defenders handle no more 
than 150 felonies or 400 misdemeanors in any year.34 The National Legal 
Aid and Defender Association has endorsed these guideposts, 35 and the 
American Bar Association has cited them approvingly multiple times. 36 
Commentators have recognized that these caseload standards "have been 
widely adopted and proven quite durable." 37 Yet, public defenders in 
Connecticut sometimes each handle more than 1,000 cases per year.38 A 
recent study of Virginia's indigent defense system found that in most local 
jurisdictions public defenders were carrying between 100 and 200 open 
cases at any given time, far in excess of recommended standards.39 One 
overwhelmed lawyer explained that because the public defenders have so 
33 Lee, supra note 6, at 377-78. 
34 NAT'L ADVISORY COMM'N ON CRIMINAL JUSTICE STANDARDS & GOALS, COURTS, at Standard 
13.12 (1973). 
35 See STANDARDS FOR DEFENSE 13.12, NAT'L LEGAL AID & DEFENDER AsS'N, DEFENDER 
RESOURCES, http://www.nlada.org/Defender/Defender_Standards/Defender_Standards_NLADA 
(referring to the standards promulgated by the National Commission on Criminal Justice and Goals) 
(last visited August 26, 2007). 
36 GIDEON'S BROKEN PROMISE, supra note 5, at 17-18; THE SPANGENBERG GROUP, KEEPING 
DEFENDER WORKLOADS MANAGEABLE 8 (2001), available at 
http://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffilesllbja/185632.pdf. 
37 Scott Wallace & David Carroll, The Implementation and Impact of Indigent Defense Standards, 
31 S.U. L REv. 245, 269 (2004). 
38 Wagner, supra note 31. 
39 VIRGINIA REPORT, supra note 4, at 27-29. 
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many open cases, "we let things slide. We cannot help it. We don't have 
time for investigation or research."40 
A Minnesota public defender recently quit his job after handling 135 
felony cases, nearly 400 misdemeanors, and nearly 200 other matters in a 
single year.41 He was doing the job of at least two full-time lawyers. In a 
seven-month period, a single public defender in Louisiana represented 418 
defendants.42 A more recent Louisiana study found that a part-time public 
defender in Avoyelles Parish was paid $19,200 to handle all of the 
jurisdiction's 1008 misdemeanor cases and 256 juvenile cases. Without 
taking into account the felony arraignments he was expected to staff and 
the additional private cases he also maintained, the "part-time" public 
defender was handling four-and-a-half times as many cases as national 
caseload guidelines recommend. 43 In another Louisiana parish, public 
defenders, in addition to defending private clients, carry an average open 
caseload of 590 felonies and 150 misdemeanors, far in excess of national 
guidelines.44 And so the story goes throughout the United States. 
2. Lengthy Delays Before Meeting With Lawyers 
Because of their crushing caseloads, many defense lawyers lack the 
time to meet with their clients, instead spending almost their entire 
workday in triage, negotiating guilty pleas on the eve of trial and, in worst-
case situations, actually trying cases. 45 Under these circumstances, over-
burdened public defenders have little time for the "less important" task of 
visiting their clients in jail and pushing for speedy bail hearings. For 
instance, a study of Calcasieu Parish in Louisiana found that public 
defenders who represented 85% of the inmates made 31 jailhouse visits, 
while private lawyers who represented 15% of the inmates made 236 visits 
during the same time-period. 46 The American Bar Association recently 
reported that defendants in Montana "remain in pretrial detention for up to 
five to six months without a single contact from an attorney." 47 In 
Mississippi, a woman who was arrested for stealing $200 spent eight 
40 /d. at 28-29 (quotations omitted). 
41 Conrad deFiebre, Public Defenders Seek Lighter Load; With Its Attorneys Overworked, the 
Board of Public Defense Has Asked the State's High Court for Help, STAR TRlBUNE, Aug. 30,2003, at 
IB, available at LEXIS, News Library, STRIB File. The average Minnesota public defender handles 
more than 900 cases per year. Backus & Marcus, supra note I, at I 055-56. 
42 See State v. Peart, 621 So. 2d 780,784 (La. 1993). 
43 Beane, supra note 26, at **12-13. 
44 /d. at *16. 
45 See Bright, supra note 2, at 790 (discussing "triage"); Darryl K. Brown, Rationing Criminal 
Defense Entitlements: An Argument From Institutional Design, 104 COLUM. L. REv. 801, 809 (2004) 
(discussing the rationing of scarce resources). 
46 Sylvia R. Cooks & Karen Karre Fontenot, The Messiah is Not Coming: It's Time for Louisiana 
to Change its Method of Funding Indigent Defense, 31 S.U. L. REV. 197,209 (2004) (citing MICHAEL 
M. KURTH & DARYL V. BURCKET, DEFENDING THE INDIGENT IN SOUTiiWEST LoUISIANA 33 (2004)). 
47 GIDEON'S BROKEN PROMISE, supra note 5, at 23. 
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months in jail without ever seeing a lawyer.48 Eventually, she gave up 
hope of receiving a lawyer and pled guilty to time served just to get out 
. '149 Jal. 
The problem is just as serious in jurisdictions that utilize appointed 
counsel systems. Because many jurisdictions cap the total fees that 
appointed counsel recover, defense lawyers reap diminishing returns for 
each extra hour they work on a case. 5° This creates a strong disincentive to 
make extra trips to the jail to meet with indigent clients prior to their 
arraignments. The fee caps imposed by the Commonwealth of Virginia are 
instructive. Virginia pays appointed lawyers at a rate of $90 per hour, but 
caps the payment for serious felonies at $395.51 Thus, after four-and-a-half 
hours of work, the appointed lawyer is working for free, hardly an 
incentive to take time-consuming trips to the local jail to meet promptly 
with new clients. As a result, many appointed lawyers behave strategically 
and wait until they have been assigned a substantial number of new clients 
before going to the local jail to meet with any of them. As one appointed 
lawyer candidly explained, "[I] will wait three to four weeks after 
appointment to visit in-custody clients so [I] can visit six or seven in the 
same trip to the jail. "52 
3. Assembly Line Guilty Pleas 
When indigent defendants do meet with their lawyers, they are often 
afforded assembly-line justice. Because defense lawyers have more cases 
than they can handle, they have a strong incentive to plead the cases out, 
and to do so quickly. 53 The problem is particularly vexing in jurisdictions 
that subject appointed counsel to fee caps because each additional hour 
worked provides diminishing returns or no payment whatsoever. 54 As one 
appointed lawyer explained, "in a court-appointed case [we spend] as little 
time as possible ... 'if we want to make a living we have to get rid of the 
case as quickly as possible. "'55 Not surprisingly, a study of New York City 
48 /d. 
49 /d.; see also Backus & Marcus, supra note 1, at 1032-34 (recounting other egregious stories). 
50 See Stuntz, supra note 8, at 10 ("The real key to the statutory fee schedules, however, is not the 
hourly amounts but the caps on total fees. Most states have such caps."). 
51 See VA. CODE ANN.§ 19.2-163 (2007). The statute actually authorizes $445 per felony charge, 
but the legislature has not provided adequate funding. VIRGINIA REPORT, supra note 4, at 48. 
52 VIRGINIA REPORT, supra note 4, at 51. 
53 See Sablatura, supra note 25 (quoting Professor David Dow saying that "[p]art of the problem 
is that indigent cases pay so little that a court-appointed attorney needs a Jot of cases to make a 
living ... [a]nd the only way for attorneys to handle a large number of cases is to plead out as many 
clients as they can as fast as they can"). 
54 See Stephanos Bibas, Transparency and Participation in Criminal Procedure, 81 N.Y.U. L. 
REv. 911, 922 (2006) ("[D]efense lawyers who receive flat or capped fees can earn more if they have 
high turnover. The press of large caseloads and limited funding and support staff also pushes many 
lawyers and judges to settle quickly, before investing much work."). 
55 VIRGINIA REPORT, supra note 4, at 50. 
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found that government-funded lawyers filed substantially fewer motions 
than retained counsel. 56 
The situation is actually worse in jurisdictions that use low-bid 
contractors for their indigent defense cases because such lawyers have no 
incentive to do anything other than plead defendants guilty. For instance, 
McDuffie County, Georgia, assigned all of its indigent defense cases to a 
lawyer who offered to handle the cases for about half as much payment as 
any other bidder. 57 Over a five-year period, that lawyer encouraged 
hundreds of defendants to plead guilty while conducting only two jury 
trials and filing only seven pre-trial motions. 58 Needless to say, the lawyer 
conducted no factual or legal investigation of his clients' cases and, in 
most instances, met with them only moments before they plead guilty. 59 
The American Bar Association has reported that over a five-year 
period in Quitman County, Mississippi, 42% of indigent defense cases 
were resolved by guilty pleas when the defense lawyer first met the 
defendant at his arraignment. 60 Obviously, the defense lawyer did not 
conduct a thorough interview with the client, meet the witnesses, or visit 
the crime scene. In Clark County, Nevada, which employs seventy 
lawyers, approximately 99.5% of cases are resolved without going to 
trial.61 Worse yet, a Montana lawyer, who had a contract to handle all of a 
county's indigent defense cases, "once bragged to the chief prosecutor in 
his county that 'he got out of the 1990s without a trial. "'62 
4. Incompetent and Under-Resourced Trial Lawyers 
Because funding for indigent defense is so low, competent lawyers 
usually refuse to take appointed cases. As a Virginia prosecutor explained: 
Very few experienced attorneys are on those [court-
appointed] lists, and the reason is, they can't afford to be on 
them. So you either have very inexperienced attorneys right 
out of law school for whom any money is better than no 
money. Or you have people who are really bad lawyers who 
56 Michael McConville & Chesler L. Mirsky, Criminal Defense of the Poor in New York City, 15 
N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc. CHANGE 581, 767-70 (1986-1987); see also Darryl K. Brown, Defense 
Attorney Discretion to Ration Services and Shortchange Some Clients, 42 BRANDEIS L.J. 207, 212 
(2003) ("Attorneys are assigned more cases than they can plausibly handle, so that each client has 
formal representation but the quantity and quality of representation is constrained. Attorneys forgo 
motion practice, investigation options, and witness preparation."). 
57 Margaret H. Lemos, Note, Civil Challenges to the Use of Low-Bid Contracts for Indigent 
Defense, 75 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1808, 1808-09 (2000). 
58 /d. at 1809. 
59 /d. 
60 GIDEON'S BROKEN PROMISE, supra nole 5, at 16. 
61 /d. at 19. 
62/d. 
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can't make a living except off the court-appointed list. 63 
Moreover, even though some appointed lawyers and public defenders 
are competent lawyers, these attorneys often lack the tools to provide a 
competent defense. While prosecutors have access to police investigators 
and forensic labs, most defense lawyers lack the funding for similar 
resources. 64 At most, the typical public defender office has one or two 
investigators struggling to work on thousands of cases per year.65 Due to a 
lack of resources, many courts either refuse funding for expert witness or 
only allot a trivial amount of money.66 Additionally, government-funded 
lawyers often have inadequate access to basic legal tools such as law 
libraries, internet access, fax machines, and clerical support. 67 For 
instance, a recent investigation of Louisiana found that one prosecutor's 
office had recently undergone an $850,000 renovation and "exude[d] 
professionalism," while the indigent defense board was "in disarray," with 
no receptionist and papers and case files piled in the hallway.68 
5. Wrongful Convictions, Unjust Sentences, and Defaulted Appeals 
When indigent defendants proceed to trial they are often represented 
either by incompetent lawyers, attorneys handling too many cases to 
perform satisfactorily, or competent lawyers who lack the resources to put 
forth an adequate defense. Not surprisingly, these indigent defendants are 
almost always found guilty at trial.69 And while most criminal defendants 
63 Laura LaFay, Virginia's Poor Receive Justice on the Cheap: Rock-Bottom Pay for Court-
Appointed Lawyers Undermines System, Lawyer Says, VIRGINIAN-PILOT, Feb. 15, 1998, at AI, 
available at LEXIS, News library, V APILT File; see also VIRGINIA REPORT, supra note 4, at 52 
(quoting an attorney as saying that "[n]o attorney with any self respect will do these [appointed] cases 
any longer than he has to"). 
64 See, e.g., THE SPANGENBERG GROUP, INDIGENT DEFENSE IN GEORGIA: A STUDY FOR THE 
CHIEF JUSTICE'S COMMISSION ON INDIGENT DEFENSE 67 (2002), available at 
http://www.georgiacourts.org/aodpress/iddidc.html ("[E]ven attorneys who feel an investigator or 
expert would help in their cases are reluctant to file motions securing investigative help a) because it 
will be a waste of time, as such requests are routinely denied and/or b) because it might annoy 
judges."). 
65 See, e.g., State v. Peart, 621 So.2d 780,784 (La. 1993) (explaining that three investigators were 
responsible for handling 7,000 cases per year); Beane, supra note 26, at *16 (explaining that in 
Calcasieu Parish "the District Attorney's Office has 14 staff investigators as well as investigative 
assistance from local law enforcement, [but] the Public Defender's Office has only two staff 
investigators"); VIRGINIA REPORT, supra note 4, at 38 (reporting that there are a total of twenty-six 
investigators to handle all of the indigent defense cases in the Commonwealth of Virginia and that "the 
vast majority of cases receive no investigative work"); Rodney Uphoff, Convicting the Innocent: 
Aberration or Systemic Problem?, 2006 WIS. L. REV. 739, 780--81 (explaining that most indigent 
defendants "have little or no investigation done on their cases"). 
66 GIDEON'S BROKEN PROMISE, supra note 5, at 10--11; Backus & Marcus, supra note I, at 1099-
liOO. 
67 GIDEON'S BROKEN PROMISE, supra note 5, at 10; VIRGINIA REPORT ,supra note 4, at 36-38. 
68 NAT'L LEGAL AID & DEFENDER AsS'N, supra note 26, at 54. 
69 See Dean J. Champion, Private Counsels and Public Defenders: A Look at Weak Cases, Prior 
Records and Leniency in Plea Bargaining, 17 J. CRtM. JUST. 253, 258 (1989) (concluding that 
defendants represented by public defenders have fewer trials and a greater number of convictions than 
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are in fact guilty, wrongful convictions occur, and innocent indigent 
defendants are at greater risk than those with retained counsel. The 
Innocence Project, which has helped to free scores of innocent felons over 
the last fifteen years, identifies the lack of funding for indigent defense as 
one of the prime reasons for wrongful convictions. 70 In one recent case, 
DNA technology exonerated a man who had served more than fifteen years 
for child rape. 71 At trial, his appointed lawyer did not attempt to exclude 
an equivocal eyewitness identification, filed no pre-trial motions, 
undertook no investigation, presented no expert testimony, and failed to 
even file an appeal. 72 The apparent reason for the appalling representation 
(and the wrongful conviction) was that the lawyer had a flat-fee contract 
with the county and received the same minimal compensation, regardless 
of whether he prepared adequately or not. 73 Countless other innocent 
victims surely languish in prison due to the inadequate representation they 
received as a result of the under-funding of indigent defense. 74 
Wrongful convictions are not the only problem however. Studies 
demonstrate that defendants represented by under-funded defense lawyers 
are sentenced to longer prison terms 75 than their non-indigent 
counterparts.76 Because most defendants plea bargain, sentencing is often 
defendants represented by private counsel). 
70 See Innocence Project: Bad Lawyering, http://www.innocenceproject.org/understand/Bad-
Lawyering.php); see also Adele Bernhard, Trends in Defense Services Standards, in 1 U.S. DEPT OF 
JUSTICE, COMPENDIUM OF STANDARDS FOR INDIGENT DEFENSE SYSTEMS: STANDARDS FOR 
ADMINISTRATION OF DEFENSE SYSTEMS 20 (2000), 
http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/indigentdefense/compendium/standardsvllvlintro.htm ("In every study of 
wrongful convictions, investigators inevitably conclude that ineffective assistance of counsel [or] bad 
lawyering has played a significant role."). 
71 Innocence Project: Jimmy Ray Bromgard, http://www.innocenceproject.org/Content/6l.php 
(last visited Sept. 22, 2007). 
72 Lefstein, supra note 3, at 860. 
73 /d. 
74 See BARRY SCHECK ET AL., ACTUAL INNOCENCE: FIVE DAYS FROM EXECUTION AND OTHER 
DISPATCHES FROM THE WRONGLY CONVICTED (2000); Lefstein, supra note 3, at 858--{)0 (describing 
the prospect of thousands of wrongful convictions each year and explaining that "[n]either the number 
of mistakes attributable to defense counsel errors nor the exact number of wrongful convictions can 
ever be known"). On the problem of innocent defendants pleading guilty to avoid the risks of trial with 
a poor defense lawyer, see Uphoff, supra note 65, at 796-802. 
1s See generally Morris B. Hoffman et al., An Empirical Study of Public Defender Effectiveness: 
Self-Selection By the "Marginally Indigent', 3 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 223 (2005) (finding that Denver 
public defenders achieved worse sentencing outcomes for their clients than private defense counsel but 
cautioning that the results may be due to "marginally-indigent" defendants who know they have worse 
cases opting for public defenders rather than scraping together the money to pay private counsel in a 
losing battle); see also Sablatura, supra note 25, at AI ("Criminal defendants in Harris County 
represented by court-appointed attorneys were twice as likely to be sentenced to jail or prison than 
defendants with money to hire their own lawyers .... ");Champion, supra note 69, at 261 (studying 
1175 cases and finding that for plea agreements secured by public defenders "the incarceration periods 
were significantly longer compared with lengths of incarceration contained in plea agreements 
involving private attorneys"). 
76 Moreover, because some of the most appalling representation occurs in capital cases, indigent 
defendants face greater risks of being sentenced to death. For instance, the infamous Joe Frank 
Cannon-the late Houston lawyer who repeatedly was appointed to cases even though he had slept 
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determined by the attorneys' deal-making skills. Given that the extremely 
complicated federal and state sentencing guidelines (and the cases 
interpreting them) are thousands of pages long, savvy and hard-working 
lawyers have considerable room to negotiate during plea bargaining, thus 
ensuring better sentencing deals than those procured by inexperienced or 
over-worked lawyers.77 In this respect, indigent defendants represented by 
public defenders (who are repeat players) may be better off than defendants 
represented by appointed lawyers. Yet, even the hardest working public 
defenders-many of whom are quite savvy-are handicapped by a lack of 
time to explore and research potentially helpful sentencing issues. 
Additionally, as Professor Stephanos Bibas has pointed out, because 
mandatory minimum and maximum sentences pervade criminal law, 
"[k]nowledgeable defense lawyers who act quickly may strike early 
charge-bargains before a grand jury indicts" thus guaranteeing 
substantially lower sentences. 78 By contrast, overwhelmed government-
funded lawyers typically do not meet with their clients until well after 
indictment and therefore have no opportunity to utilize this tactic in the 
hopes of securing a lower sentence. 
Finally, indigent defendants suffer on appeal as well. A recent review 
of defaulted appeals in Virginia found that public defenders and court-
appointed lawyers were responsible for more than 70% of the defaults. 79 
Either because these lawyers were too busy or too incompetent, they failed 
to file the simple piece of paper necessary to preserve an appeal. More 
disheartening, judges continued to appoint these lawyers to represent 
indigent defendants, including one lawyer who defaulted six appeals in a 
single year.80 
In sum, because the fees paid to appointed lawyers are so low, quality 
lawyers refuse to take the cases and judges have no choice but to re-
appoint incompetent or overwhelmed lawyers. Indigent defendants suffer 
during pre-trial discovery, at motion practice, during trial, at sentencing, 
through prior trials--saw ten of his clients go to death row. Bright, Neither Equal Nor Just, supra note 
2, at 789; see also Barrett, supra note 24 (noting that "Mr. Cannon's collection of 10 death sentences is 
one of the largest among active lawyers). For an account of "the ineptitude" of a court-appointed 
lawyer representing a death-row inmate see David R. Dow, The State, the Death Penalty, and Carl 
Johnson, 37 B.C. L. REv. 691, 694-95 (1996). Courts continue to appoint inadequate lawyers-even 
in death-penalty cases-because the funding appropriated for indigent defense is far too low to attract 
better Ia wyers. 
71 See Stephanos Bibas, Plea Bargaining Outside the Shadow of Trial, 117 HARV. L. REv. 2463, 
2483-84 (2004) (explaining that "[c]omplexity favors intelligent, savvy repeat players who build up 
expertise and who pool information" whereas "[g]uidelines neophytes, in contrast, may be ignorant of 
these opportunities"). 
78 /d. at 2484. 
79 Editorial, Courts of No Appeal, WASH. POST, July 4, 2004, at B6, available at LEXIS, News 
Library, WPOST File. 
80 Editorial, Inexcusable Delay, WASH. PosT, July 5, 2004, at Al6, available at LEXIS, News 
library, WPOST File. 
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and on appeal. 
ill. THE REFORM ATTEMPTS: FAILURE OR FLEETING SUCCESSES 
Frustrated with the lack of indigent defense funding, public defenders, 
criminal defense associations, and law firms working in pro bono 
capacities have brought litigation to demand increased funding for indigent 
defense. The results have been disappointing. As detailed below, many 
efforts have failed at the outset, with courts dismissing the litigation 
outright. In other cases, legal victories have been achieved in court, only 
to see the improvements vanish over time. 81 
A. Outright Defeats 
For more than a generation, the most obvious avenue for vindication of 
criminal defendants' rights has been in federal court. 82 This is not so with 
indigent defense, however. Federal courts have rejected systemic 
challenges to state indigent defense systems on abstention grounds. 83 
Applying Younger abstention, courts have held that so long as there is an 
available remedy in state court, federal courts should not interfere with 
ongoing state criminal proceedings. 
Many state courts also have been unsympathetic to systemic challenges 
because the plaintiff bringing the case cannot personally point to 
inadequate representation. For instance, when a Minnesota public 
defender sought a declaratory judgment that the indigent defense system 
was unconstitutional because the lack of funding resulted in ineffective 
assistance of counsel, the state supreme court rejected the challenge 
because the indigent defendant could not demonstrate that his particular 
lawyer was sub-standard. 84 Likewise, the Virginia Court of Appeals 
rejected a challenge to fee caps that limited attorney recovery to less than 
$400 per case because the lawyer bringing the challenge had "zealously" 
represented his client. 85 Similar litigation efforts have failed in Alabama, 86 
81 For the best analysis of the failed litigation efforts, see Wright, supra note 9, at 244-48. 
82 For the classic article praising the ability of federal courts over state courts to protect individual 
rights, see Burt Neuborne, The Myth of Parity, 90 HARV. L. REv. 1105 (1977). While the perception of 
federal superiority has long existed, scholars have questioned whether it is in fact true. See generally 
Michael E. Solimine, The Future of Parity, 46 WM. & MARY L. REv. 1457 (2005) (discussing the 
literature). 
83 See Luckey v. Miller, 976 F.2d 673, 679 (II th Cir. 1992) ("This Court does not believe that it 
should exercise its equitable jurisdiction in this case."); Wallace v. Kern, 520 F.2d 400, 408 (2d Cir. 
1975) (reversing the order below because it "created an intrusion upon existing state criminal process 
which is fissiparous and gratuitous .... "). For a criticism of federal courts' reluctance to intervene, see 
Rodger Citron, Note, (Un)Luckey v. Miller: The Case for a Structural Injunction to Improve Indigent 
Defense Services, 101 YALE L. J. 481 (1991). 
84 Kennedy v. Carlson, 544 N.W.2d I (Minn. 1996). 
85 Webb v. Commonwealth, 528 S.E.2d 138, 142 (Va. Ct. App. 2000). The focus on "actual 
injury" is a particularly vexing problem because the lawyers who typically raise challenges to the 
under-funding of indigent defense are themselves hardworking and effective, even in spite of their 
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Iowa,87 Michigan,88 New Jersey,89 Utah,90 and Vermont.91 
More creative challenges have failed as well. In Mississippi, clever 
lawyers tried to attack the lack of state indigent defense funding by using a 
county-rather than a criminal defendant-as the plaintiff and naming the 
state as a defendant. Although a high-powered legal team represented the 
county pro bono for more than five years, the Mississippi Supreme Court 
flatly rejected the claim.92 
B. Settlement Victories ... Or So They Seemed 
Not all litigation has failed outright however. In a handful of cases, 
litigation has led to compromise legislation that has been lauded by the 
media and some reform activists. Ultimately, however, the results of the 
legislation have been unsatisfactory. 
In 2003, the New York County Lawyer's Association (NYCLA) 
convinced a trial judge that the rates for assigned counsel-$40 per hour 
for in-court work and $25 per hour for out-of-court work-were so low as 
to deny effective representation.93 Recognizing that "it does not have the 
capacity or the resources, nor is it in the best position to provide a 
comprehensive ... solution," the court nevertheless ordered that rates be 
raised to $90 per hour. 94 The court encouraged the legislature to get 
involved, explaining that it is "in a better position to investigate, hold 
hearings, formulate, debate, [and] identify funding sources ... to best meet 
crushing caseloads. For instance, the lawyer who had the courage to bring the challenge in 
Webb-Steven Benjamin-has served as President of the Virginia Association of Criminal Defense 
Lawyers and won the prestigious Lewis F. Powell pro bono award. Profile of Steven D. Benjamin, 
Benjamin & Desportes, P.C., http://www.lawyers.com/benjamin&desportes/jsp2209433.jsp (last 
visited Sept. 22, 2007). 
86 See Ex Parte Grayson, 479 So. 2d 76, 79 (Ala. 1985) ("We do not find that [a $500 cap on 
expenses] contravenes the defendant's Sixth Amendment rights."). 
87 See Lewis v. Iowa Dist. Court, 555 N.W.2d 216, 220 (Iowa 1996) ("[A]lthough the amount 
awarded a court-appointed attorney may be less than what an attorney may charge a private client, the 
guidelines themselves are not per se unreasonable."). 
88 See Wayne County Criminal Def. Bar Ass'n v. Chief Judges of Wayne Cir. Court, 663 N.W.2d 
471, 472 (Mich. 2003) (noting that the fee schedule adopted by the Wayne Circuit Courts does not 
"fail[] to provide assigned counsel reasonable compensation"). Notably, earlier litigation efforts in 
Michigan had proved successful, but sufficient benefits did not materialize. See Recorder's Bar Ass' n 
v. Wa~ne County Court, 503 N.W.2d 885 (Mich. 1993). 
9 See Madden V. Delran, 601 A.2d 211, 212 (N.J. 1992) (concluding that the government should 
not be ordered to "pay attorneys who are assigned by the municipal court to represent defendants too 
poor to pay for counsel"). 
90 See State v. Taylor, 947 P.2d 681, 688 (Utah 1997) (upholding lower courts decision that the 
minimal compensation provided to the defendant's attorney did not affect the attorney's "strategy and 
efforts"). 
91 See State v. Bacon, 658 A.2d 54,66 (Vt. 1995) (holding that the "States failure to pay defense 
counsel in a timely manner for expenses and services in connection with this case" does not create a 
conflict of interest for the defending attorney). 
92 Quitman County v. Mississippi, 910 So. 2d 1032 (Miss. 2005). 
93 New York County Lawyers' Ass'n v. State, 763 N.Y.S.2d 397,400 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2003). 
94 /d. at 410. 
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the needs of the assigned counsel scheme."95 Perhaps fearing a reversal,96 
the County Lawyer's Association accepted a settlement whereby the 
legislature agreed to new rates of up to $75 per hour to take effect in 
2004.97 
Most observers counted the NYCLA case as a victory for indigent 
defense, 98 yet the victory was hollow. As part of the compromise, the 
legislation provided for a task force to be created to review the sufficiency 
of assigned counsel rates and issue a report to the Governor and the 
Legislature by January 15, 2006. Yet, no one was appointed to the task 
force and no report was ever issued. 99 Accordingly, as one observer 
recently remarked, "the rates will not be adjusted or even reviewed'' as was 
intended by the compromise legislation, and "the state seems again on a 
path where counsel rates remain stagnant for years as the basic ... living 
expenses of attorneys increase." 100 
Even more problematic, the increased fees for appointed counsel 
resulting from the NYCLA litigation have actually made representation for 
most indigent defendants worse. 101 Many New York jurisdictions rely on 
both appointed counsel and public defenders, and the NYCLA decision only 
mandated higher compensation for the former. Because the State of New 
York did not provide sufficient funding to cover the higher fees for 
appointed counsel, cash-strapped jurisdictions turned to cheaper and 
already over-burdened public defenders to handle even more cases. 102 The 
Legal Aid Society, which already provided the bulk of indigent defense 
representation in New York City, was called upon to handle more cases, 
yet it did not receive additional funding to deal with those cases. To the 
contrary, budget shortfalls forced the Legal Aid Society to layoff 25% of 
95/d. 
96 Within a few weeks of the favorable court ruling, the City filed a notice of appeal which 
prevented the judicially ordered rate increases from taking immediate effect. Susan Saulny, Court 
Appeal Puts Off Raise for Poor Clients ' Lawyers, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 27, 2003, at 83, availilble at 
LEXIS, News Library, NYT File. 
97 See N.Y. COUNTY LAw§ 722-b (McKinney 2007). 
98 See Susan Saulny, Lawyers ' Fees to Defend the Poor Will Increase, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 13, 
2003, at Bl, available at LEXIS, News Library, NYT File (quoting NYCLA Vice President's response 
to the legislative compromise as a "major breakthrough" that is "having a ripple effect on indigent-
defense systems across the country''); Susan Saulny, Judge Orders Rates Doubled for Lawyers for the 
Poor, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 6, 2003, at B3, available at LEXIS, News Library, NYT File (quoting the 
NYCLA Vice President's response to the court ruling as, "[t]his is great news"). 
99 COMM'N ON THE FuTuRE OF INDIGENT DEFENSE, FINAL REPORT TO THE CHIEF JUDGE OF THE 
STATEOFNEWYORK 12, 13 n.29 (2006). 
100 John Caher, Report Calls for Replilcement of Indigent Defense System: Lack of Standards, 
Inadequate Funds, Poor Training Cited, N.Y.L.J., Col. 3, June 29, 2006, at I, availilble at Westlaw, 
Legal News Library, NYU File. 
101 See id. rTnhe hard fought effort to increase assigned counsel rates ... actually had a negative 
impact on indigent defense representation."). 
102 THE SPANGENBERG GROUP, STATUS OF INDIGENT DEFENSE IN NEW YORK: A STUDY FOR 
CHIEF JUDGE KAYE'S COMMISSION ON THE FUTURE OF INDIGENT DEFENSE SERVICES 153, !56 (2006). 
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its support staff in 2004.103 
Thus, three years after the NYCLA decision, a report by a nationally 
recognized indigent defense expert concluded that "New York's indigent 
defense system is in a serious state of crisis and suffers from an acute and 
chronic lack of funding." 104 
A similar tum of events recently occurred in Massachusetts. In 2004, 
the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court concluded that indigent 
defendants' constitutional rights were being violated because the state paid 
attorneys so poorly-as little as $30 per hour-that it could no! attract 
enough lawyers, leaving defendants to languish in jail. 105 The court did not 
raise lawyers' hourly rates, but instead ordered that if defendants were not 
provided with counsel within seven days of their arrest they would have to 
be released. 106 About one year after the court's decision, the legislature 
raised rates by $7.50 per hour, 107 and various groups declared victory. 108 
Yet, the victory was short-lived. Within a year, the Massachusetts' 
indigent defense commission ran out of money to pay its bills (including its 
lawyers and investigators), and in the next budget session legislators 
attempted to cut the funding necessary for the rate increases. 109 In any 
event, even the nominal rate increases were not enough to satisfy local 
attorneys and there continues to be a shortage of lawyers to handle 
appointed cases. 110 
C. Litigation Victories ... Or So They Seemed 
More celebrated than the compromise legislation adopted in New York 
and Massachusetts are the handful of decisions in which courts have 
clearly ruled in favor of indigent defendants. Once again however, these 
successes are less than meets the eye. 
In the most famous decision, State v. Peart, the Louisiana Supreme 
Court considered the plight of a defendant who was represented by a public 
defender who had represented more than 400 defendants in a seven-month 
103 ld. at 132, 163. 
104 Jd. at 155. 
105 Lavallee v. Justices, 812 N.E.2d 895, 899-901 (Mass. 2004). 
106 Jd. at 901. A handful of defendants were released because appointed lawyers refused to 
provide representation. Conor W. Daly, Avoiding a New Willie Horton Problem: Creating a Better 
Public Counsel System in Massachusetts, 18 GEO. J.L. Ennes 679,684 (2005). 
107 MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 2110, § 11 (West 2007). 
108 See THE SPANGENBERG GROUP, INDIGENT DEFENSE IN MASSACHUSETTS: A CASE HISTORY OF 
REFORM 1 (2005) ("On July 29, 2005, the Massachusetts Legislature made significant changes to the 
Massachusetts system of indigent defense and substantially increased the appropriation for indigent 
defense services."). 
109 See Noah Schaffer, Bar Advocate Monday is Gone, MASS. LAW. WKLY., July 17,2006 ("[llhe 
increase for private counsel slated to go through this year was stripped from the fiscal 2007 budget that 
recently came out of a conference committee."). 
110 Bar Advocates Say Raise Not Enough, CAPE Coo TiMEs, July 23, 2005, available at 
http://www.bristolcpcs.org/CapeCod20050723.html. 
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period and had a felony trial scheduled for every trial date on the docket. 111 
The court labeled the indigent defense system a "crisis" and called on the 
legislature to act. 112 In the interim, the court imposed a presumption that 
all indigent defendants in an under-funded jurisdiction were receiving 
ineffective assistance of counsel, and it placed the burden on the 
government to rebut the ineffectiveness presumption. 113 The Supreme 
Court further instructed trial judges that if they were not satisfied with the 
level of representation they "shall not permit the prosecution to go forward 
until the defendant is provided with reasonably effective assistance of 
counsel." 114 Finally, the court threatened that if "legislative action is not 
forthcoming and indigent defense reform does not take place" the court 
"may find it necessary to employ more intrusive and specific measures." 115 
At least initially, the court's decision in Peart had its desired effect. 
The State of Louisiana increased funding for public defenders by $5 
million and created a task force to study the situation. 116 The progress was 
short-lived however. Judges presented with clearly guilty defendants have 
been reluctant to enforce the Peart rule and possibly set guilty criminals 
free. 117 More importantly, the rebuttable presumption of ineffective 
assistance of counsel has not encouraged the legislature to enact further 
funding increases, thereby allowing compensation rates. to stagnate. 118 As 
one of the dissenting Justices in Peart complained, the court's decision 
"failed to set forth any standards to give the legislative and executive 
branches guidance in bringing the system into constitutional 
compliance." 119 
Thus, although the legislature provided some additional funding in the 
wake of the Peart decision, in subsequent years the funding did not keep 
up with inflation or continually increasing caseloads, 120 and Louisiana's 
111 State v. Peart, 621 So. 2d 780, 784 {La. 1993); see also GIDEON'S BROKEN PROMISE, supra 
note 5, at 2073 (discussing rebuttable presumption of ineffective assistance of counsel). 
112 Peart, 621 So. 2d at 790. 
113 /d. at 791. 
114 /d. at 792. 
tts /d. at 791. 
116 Pascal F. Calogero, Jr., The State of Indigent Defense in Louisiana, 42 LA. B.J. 454, 457-58 
(1995). 
117 As one Louisiana appellate judge has remarked, releasing defendants under ineffective 
assistance of counsel theories "likely will result in heightening public distrust in the bench and bar. 
Releasing defendants, who potentially represent a threat to the public, to solve an ill in the system is a 
remedy far too risky to embrace when alternative solutions are available." Cooks & Fontenot, supra 
note 46, at 213. 
118 See id. at 209 (describing the local funding of indigent defense more than a decade after Peart 
and explaining that the State of Louisiana contributes less than $2 per case); Wright, supra note 9, at 
251 (''The heartening victory in the Peart litigation unraveled in less than a decade."). 
119 Peart, 621 So. 2d at 795 (Dennis, J., dissenting). 
120 Effectively Ineffective, supra note 12, at 1738; see also Wright, supra note 9, at 249 (describing 
judicial solutions such as the one in Peart as "temporary"). 
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indigent defense system is still in tatters. 121 A trial court recently 
"expressed its frustration with the continued lack of funding and the fact 
that it faces some version of the same funding dilemma in virtually every 
criminal case before it." 122 The trial court ordered the parish to set aside 
hundreds of thousands of dollars for indigent defense, but the Louisiana 
Supreme Court reversed, holding that the courts lacked authority to issue 
such an order to the parishes. 123 The Supreme Court was left once again to 
threaten the legislature, this time suggesting that if adequate funding is not 
appropriated, defendants will be given the option to file motions to halt the 
prosecution and possibly go free. 124 Much like the rebuttable presumption 
of ineffective assistance of counsel, the Court's new threat to allow trial 
judges to halt prosecutions is a flawed remedy because it shifts the burden 
onto trial judges to analyze individual cases, rather than creating a 
sufficient incentive for the legislature to act. 
A similar problem bedeviled an otherwise promising decision by the 
Oklahoma Supreme Court. In State v. Lynch, the court relied on its 
"inherent power to define and regulate the practice of law" to hold that a 
cap on fees for appointed counsel violated the Oklahoma Constitution. 125 
The court called on the legislature to address the problem, but in the 
meantime it increased fees for appointed counsel to be equivalent to the 
hourly rate for prosecutors. 126 As in Louisiana, the Supreme Court's action 
initially led the legislature to appropriate more funding and to create a 
supervisory indigent defense board. 127 Shortly thereafter, however, 
Oklahoma moved to a low-bid contractor approach to indigent defense, 
and funding for the indigent defense board began to dry up. 128 As one 
observer remarked: "[W]hile the [Lynch] decision inspired change, it was 
unable to sustain it." 129 
The same problem occurred after a promising decision by the Supreme 
Court of Arizona. In State v. Smith, the defendant contended that his 
appointed lawyer, a contract attorney who was responsible for all of the 
121 Beane, supra note 26, at *6; IN DEFENSE OF PuBLIC ACCESS TO JUSTICE, supra note 26, at v. 
Matters have been made even worse by Hurricane Katrina. See Gwen Filosa, Judge Blasts Financing 
for Indigent Defense, TIMES-PICAYUNE (NEW ORLEANS), June 24, 2006, at I, available at LEXIS, 
News Library, NOTPIC File (describing how Hurricane Kalrina caused more problems for an already 
overburdened system); Leslie Eaton, Judge Steps in for Poor lnmates Without Justice Since Hurricane, 
N.Y. TIMES, May 23, 2006, at AI, available at LEXIS, News Library, NYT File ("The criminal justice 
system in New Orleans was notoriously troubled long before the storms, and if anything, it is now 
worse."). 
122 State v. Citizen, 898 So. 2d 325, 329 (La. 2005). 
123 /d. at 336. 
124 ld. at 338. 
125 State v. Lynch, 796 P.2d 1150, 1163 (Okla. 1990). 
126 /d. at 1161. The Court also required compensation for reasonable overhead expenses. ld. 
127 Effectively Ineffective, supra note 12, at 1739. 
128/d. 
129 /d. at 1740. 
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city's cases, was so overwhelmed that he did not have more than a few 
hours to devote to a burglary and sexual assault case. 130 The court looked 
to the guidelines recommended by the National Legal Aid and Defender 
Association- no more than 150 felonies or 300 misdemeanors per year-
and found Smith's lawyer to be well in excess of those standards. 131 
Without finding that Smith in particular had received ineffective assistance 
of counsel, the court held that the lawyer's caseload was excessive and 
unconstitutional under the United States and Arizona Constitutions. 132 The 
court further stated that for future defendants represented by over-
burdened, low-bid contract lawyers, there would be a presumption that the 
defendant received ineffective assistance of counsel, which the government 
would have the burden of disproving. 133 
Like Peart and Lynch, the Arizona Supreme Court's decision in Smith 
was initially successful. The county adopted a new system for hiring 
counsel and it began to pay them more. 134 As with the other cases, 
however, the benefits were ephemeral, with caseloads rising and attorney 
compensation remaining stagnant in subsequent years. 135 
To be sure, there have been cases in which litigation has succeeded in 
improving indigent defense. In particular, a handful of courts have held 
statutory caps on appointed counsel's fee recovery to be 
unconstitutional. 136 Yet, the larger story is that many litigation efforts have 
proven unsuccessful, and that even the cases lauded as "successful" efforts 
have ultimately proven to be failures. 137 
130 State v. Smith, 681 P.2d 1374, 1378-79 (Ariz. 1984). 
Ill /d. at 1380. Of the systemic efforts to improve indigent defense funding, the Smith decision is 
the closest parallel to the proposal I advocate in Parts IV and V because it tied funding to case limits 
and imposed a default rule in the absence of legislative action. The Smith approach suffered from two 
flaws that should not plague my proposal: (I) it offered no way to measure continued compliance with 
caseload standards; and (2) it embraced a case-by-case inquiry for ineffective assistance of counsel, 
rather than a bright-line rule, thus putting the onus on trial judges rather than the legislature. For a 
discussion of these problems, see infra Part V.C. 
1l 2 Smith, 681 P.2d at 1381. 
Ill /d. at 1384. 
134 Effectively Ineffective, supra note 12, at 1741 . 
mid. 
1l 6 E.g., Arnold v. Kemp, 813 S.W.2d 770 (Ark. 1991); Makemson v. Martin County, 491 So.2d 
1109 (Aa. 1986); State v. Robinson, 465 A.2d 1214 (N.H. 1983). These decisions support one of the 
premises of this article: the best chance for ameliorating indigent defense through the courts is if the 
judiciary makes bright-line rulings in their traditional areas of competence, such as striking down 
particular statutory provisions as being unconstitutional. See infra Part V.C. For other smaller-scale 
victories, see Jewell v. Maynard, 383 S.E.2d 536 (W. Va. 1989) (holding that failure to compensate 
attorneys for representing indigents amounts to a taking); DeLisio v. Alaska Superior Court, 740 P.2d 
437 (Alaska 1987) (same). Additionally, a handful of other states have adopted legislation in an effort 
to improve the provision of the right to counsel. As scholars cautiously have observed, however, 
"[s]ince these changes are still in their infancy, their efficacy cannot easily be measured." Backus & 
Marcus, supra note I, at 1103. 
1l
7 There also have been thought-provoking scholarly proposals that have not been adopted by 
courts. For instance, Professor Richard Klein has suggested that trial judges hold a pre-trial conference 
to review, inter alia, pre-trial discovery, the number of times the lawyer has met with his client, and the 
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IV. RAISING THE STANDARD OF PROOF 
Because prior proposals have failed to motivate legislatures to improve 
indigent defense funding, I suggest an alternate approach that focuses on a 
bright-line rule that is particularly within the province of the judiciary: a 
higher standard of proof. After briefly reviewing the history of the 
reasonable doubt standard, I argue that state courts should respond to the 
under-funding of indigent defense by adopting a default rule that raises the 
standard of proof to "beyond all doubt" for cases involving indigent 
defendants. 
A. The Long History of the Reasonable Doubt Standard 
Since the earliest days of American history, courts have required proof 
beyond a reasonable doubt to convict criminal defendants. 138 And 
although no specific clause of the U.S. Constitution requires proof beyond 
a reasonable doubt, the Supreme Court implicitly has accepted the 
formulation for decades. 139 Finally, in 1970, after a lower court tried to 
utilize a lower standard of proof in cases involving juveniles, the Supreme 
Court specifically held that there is a constitutional guarantee for the 
"accused against conviction except upon proof beyond a reasonable doubt 
of every fact necessary to constitute the crime with which he is 
charged." 140 
Despite its long history, the reasonable doubt concept has not remained 
entirely static. Scholars have demonstrated that the language used to 
describe "reasonable doubt" has softened, thus arguably lowering the 
standard of proof. 141 In the founding period, reasonable doubt was equated 
legal issues that need to be researched. In the alternative, Professor Klein suggested that judges require 
lawyers to complete a written worksheet indicating what steps they have taken during the 
representation. Richard Klein, The Relationship of the Court and Defense Counsel: The Impact on 
Competent Representation and Proposals for Reform, 29 B.C. L. REV. 531, 580-82 (1988). As 
Professor Klein recognized, the likely reason this proposal has not been adopted is that holding such 
conferences or reviewing worksheets would be time-consuming and would "meet resistance in an 
already over-burdened system." /d. at 581. 
138 See Steve Sheppard, The Metamorphoses of Reasonable Doubt: How Changes in the Burden 
of Proof Have Weakened the Presumption of Innocence, 78 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 1165, 1190 (2003) 
(noting the use of the "beyond a reasonable doubt" standard in the trial of British soldiers involved in 
the Boston Massacre). 
139 See Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513,525-26 (1958) ("Where one party has at stake an interest 
of transcending value-as a criminal defendant his liberty-this margin of error is reduced as to him by 
the process of placing on the other party the burden of producing a sufficiency of proof in the first 
instance, and of persuading the factfinder at the conclusion of the trial of his guilt beyond a reasonable 
doubt."). 
140 In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970). 
141 See Erik Lillquist, Absolute Certainty and the Death Penalty, 42 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 45, 52 
(2005) [hereinafter Lillquist, Absolute) ("[B]oth the standard of proof stated by judges and the standard 
of proof applied by jurors appear to be weaker than what was understood to be required by proof 
beyond a reasonable doubt at the beginning of the nineteenth century.") (emphasis omitted); Sheppard, 
supra note 138, at 1239 ("Over time, the loss of our understanding of moral certainty and the increasing 
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with "moral certainty." 142 Today some courts continue to instruct juries 
that they must find the defendant guilty to a moral certainty, but the 
Supreme Court has frowned on such instructions. 143 In the absence of clear 
guideposts from the Supreme Court, different jurisdictions have embraced 
varied terminology to instruct juries on the meaning of reasonable doubt. 144 
Yet, while there has been great variation (and difficulty) in defining 
reasonable doubt, the use of the standard itself is largely uncontroversial. 145 
While the reasonable doubt standard remains largely unquestioned, a 
handful of commentators have suggested imposing a higher "no doubt" 
standard (or some variation) in capital cases. 146 This "no doubt" standard 
was recently endorsed by the Massachusetts Governor's Council on 
Capital Punishment, which had been empanelled to recommend a fair and 
accurate death-penalty system. 147 A primary justification for the "no 
doubt" standard in capital cases is that it would serve to minimize the 
number of wrongful convictions. 148 As explained below, a higher standard 
acceptance of articulability as a basis for reasonableness underscored a great shift in thinking about 
judgment by a juror. The courts have moved the jurors' goal from a vote for the state if the state can 
convince them of a fact to a vote for the state unless the defense can convince them of a certain type of 
doubt."). 
142 Victor v. Nebraska, 511 U.S. I, II (1994); Lawrence M. Solan, Refocusing the Burden of 
Proof in Criminal Cases: Some Doubt About Reasonable Doubt, 78 TEX. L. REv. 105, Ill (1999). 
143 Cage v. Louisiana, 498 U.S. 39, 41 (1990) (per curiam); see also Victor, 511 U.S. at 37 
(Blackmun, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (criticizing the "moral certainty" terminology 
because it could lead jurors "to believe that they could base their decision to convict upon moral 
standards or emotion in addition to or instead of evidentiary standards"). 
144 See Larry Laudan, Is Reasonable Doubt Reasonable?, 9 LEGAL THEORY 295, 301-17 (2003) 
(discussing the different definitions courts use and that some courts do not define reasonable doubt at 
all). 
145 See Erik Lillquist, Recasting Reasonable Doubt: Decision Theory and the Virtues of 
Variability, 36 U.C. DAVIS L. REv. 85, 112-17 (2002). "The complete lack of controversy that 
surrounds the reasonable doubt standard implies that we are pretty happy with the way the standard 
operates." /d. at 190--91. 
146 See JAMES S. LIEBMAN ET AL., A BROKEN SYSTEM, PART II: WHY THERE IS SO MUCH ERROR 
IN CAPITAL CASES, AND WHAT CAN BE DONE ABOUT IT 397-99 (2002), available at 
http://ww2.Iaw.cololumbia.edu/brokensystemllreport.pdf. For various articles noting the imposition of 
a higher "no doubt" standard see generally Craig M. Bradley, A (Genuinely) Modest Proposal 
Concerning the Death Penalty, 72 IND. L.J. 25 (1996); Elizabeth R. Jungman, Note, Beyond All Doubt, 
91 GEO. L.J. 1065 (2003); Margery Malkin Koosed, Averting Mistaken Executions by Adopting the 
Model Penal Code's Exclusion of Death in the Presence of Lingering Doubt, 21 N. ILL. U. L. REv. 41 
(2001); Lillquist, supra note 141; Leonard B. Sand & Danielle L. Rose, Proof Beyond All Possible 
Doubt: Is There a Need for a Higher Burden of Proof When the Sentence May Be Death?, 78 CHI. 
KENT L. REv. 1359 (2003 ). 
147 See MAsSACHUSETTS GOVERNOR'S COUNCIL ON CAPITAL PUNISHMENT, FINAL REPORT 22 
(2004), available at http://www.rnass.gov/Agov2/docs/5-3-04+MassDPReportFinal.pdf ("At the 
sentencing stage of the capital trial, as a prerequisite to the imposition of the death penalty, ... the jury 
should be required to find that there is 'no doubt' about the defendant's guilt of capital murder."). For 
a discussion of the problem associated with raising the standard of proof in capital cases, see the 
thoughtful commentary by the Council's co-chairman and noted death-penalty scholar. See Joseph L. 
Hoffmann, Protecting the Innocent: The Massachusetts Governor's Council Report, 95 J. CRIM. L. & 
CRIMINOLOGY 561, 573 (2005) ("[A]ny further shifting of the balance in favor of the capital defendant 
inevitably will produce even more 'false negatives' than it will eliminate 'false positives."'). 
148 Other commentators have argued for less drastic revisions of the standard of proof in criminal 
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of proof to convict indigent defendants could also reduce the risk of 
wrongful convictions, while at the same time serving to create incentives to 
increase funding for indigent defense. 
B. The Argument for Raising the Standard of Proof in Indigency Cases 
1. The Proposal 
The proposal to raise the standard of proof to convict indigent 
defendants calls for action at the state-court level. When litigators 
challenge indigent defense systems they often ask courts to make factual 
findings or legal conclusions that the indigent defense systems are 
unconstitutionally under-funded. 149 For courts that have made such a 
finding, the next step is to determine a remedy. Rather than ordering the 
legislature to provide more funding or subjecting the system to a structural 
injunction, courts could impose a blanket rule raising the standard of proof 
to "beyond all doubt" for all indigent defendants prosecuted from that day 
forward. In recognition of the fact that indigent defendants receive far less 
funding (and far less attorney competence) to support their defenses, the 
government would face a tougher standard to convict them. As I lay out 
below in Part V, the higher standard of proof would be a default rule that 
the legislature could opt out of by providing adequate funding. 150 
2. Why a Higher Standard of Proof Passes Constitutional Muster 
Critics might complain that a higher standard of proof is 
unconstitutional because the Supreme Court explicitly recognized in 1970 
that the Constitution requires the proof beyond a reasonable doubt standard 
in criminal cases. This objection is without merit though. In 
constitutionalizing the reasonable doubt standard, the Court adopted a 
cases. Professor Lawrence Solan, while not advocating the abandonment of the reasonable doubt 
standard, has argued that it does not focus sufficiently on the government's burden of proof, therefore 
making it easier for jurors to convict defendants in weak cases that should probably result in acquittals. 
Solan, supra note 142, at 132. Accordingly, he suggests that courts should re-direct focus to the 
government's case by instructing jurors to be "firmly convinced," rather than focusing on doubts that 
support the defendant. !d. at 145-47. Similarly, the Federal Judicial Center has proposed defining 
proof beyond a reasonable doubt as proof that leaves you "firmly convinced of the defendant's guilt." 
FED. JUDICIAL CTR., PATIERN CRIMINAL JURY INSTRUCfiONS 28 (1987). This standard has been 
endorsed by such prominent judges as Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg and Judge Jon 0. Newman. See 
Victor v. Nebraska, 511 U.S. I, 26-27 (1994) (Ginsburg, J., concurring in part and concurring in the 
judgment); Jon 0. Newman, Beyond "Reasonable Doubt", 68 N.Y.U. L. REV. 979,991 (1993). 
149 See, e.g., Quitman County v. State, 910 So. 2d 1032, 1039, 1047-48 (Miss. 2005) (rejecting 
plaintiffs claim that indigent defense was under-funded). 
150 In certain respects, the proposal resembles the inverse of certain provisions of the 
Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, which encourages states to opt into a more 
favorable procedural posture by providing funding for counsel during state habeas corpus proceedings. 
See Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-132, § 2261, 110 Stat. 
1221-22 (1996). I am grateful to Toby Heytens for making this point to me. 
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floor, not a ceiling. 151 There is nothing in the United States Constitution to 
prohibit judges from requiring a higher standard of proof in cases where 
they believe it is necessary. 152 Indeed, the Constitution does not explicitly 
provide any particular standard of proof, and the Court imposed the 
reasonable doubt standard to satisfy due process guarantees. Given that it 
is now clear that indigent defendants are not receiving adequate protections 
from their appointed counsel at trial, the Due Process Clause could be 
construed to require a heightened standard of proof. Moreover, even if 
state judges did not believe that the United States Constitution served as a 
basis for imposing a higher standard of proof, they easily could rely instead 
on their state constitutions because there is no requirement that state 
constitutions be interpreted co-terminously with the Constitution of the 
United States. 153 
Furthermore, the proposal does not run afoul of the Equal Protection 
Clause. While wealthy defendants (who retain their own counsel) will be 
treated less favorably than poor defendants-by being subjected to a lower 
standard of proof-the Supreme Court has held that wealth is not a suspect 
classification. 154 Thus, the rule would be subjected to rational basis 
scrutiny and would survive review so long as there is a legitimate 
governmental purpose and the rule is rationally related to that purpose. 155 
Ensuring that indigent defendants are adequately represented and receive a 
fair opportunity to demonstrate their innocence is certainly a legitimate 
governmental purpose. And increasing the burden of proof to convict 
those defendants is rationally related to that goal. 
Not only would the "beyond all doubt" standard be constitutional, it 
would also make sense as a matter of remedies jurisprudence. Notably, the 
proposal does not require courts to impose a higher standard of proof in all 
cases or in a vacuum. Rather, the "beyond all doubt" formulation would 
not be imposed until a state court first makes a finding that an indigent 
defense system has been unconstitutionally under-funded. Courts long 
have embraced more flexibility when remedying long-term misconduct. 
lSI See Adam M. Gershowitz, The Invisible Pillar of Gideon, 80 IND. L.J. 571, 585 (2005) 
(explaining that "the Constitution acts as a floor that limits certain state experimentation"). 
1s2 See Sand & Rose, supra note 146, at 1362-63 (explaining that courts have long recognized, 
consistent with the Constitution, various standards of proof and that "the more important the interest, 
the more certainty required in the accuracy of the adjudication"). 
ISJ See William J. Brennan, Jr., State Constitutions and the Protection of Individual Rights, 90 
HARV. L. REv. 489 (1977) (noting that state courts often extend, via state constitutions, greater rights 
than the federal Constitution affords). 
Is• San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. I (1973). 
Iss See, e.g., Williamson v. Lee Optical, 348 U.S. 483, 487-88, 491 (1955) (applying rational 
basis review). Furthermore, while it is true that the great majority of indigent defendants are African-
American, and thus white defendants will be disproportionately saddled with the Jess rigorous 
reasonable doubt standard, disparate effects, by themselves, are not enough to nullify a governmental 
action. See, e.g., Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976). Rather, there must be a discriminatory 
purpose, and none is demonstrated here. 
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For instance, in affirmative action cases, courts are far more likely to 
permit racial preferences if there has been a history of discrimination than 
if the preferences were adopted in the abstract. 156 The same approach 
applies here. The proposal to raise the standard of proof would not be 
advanced because courts think it is an abstractly useful idea, but rather to 
remedy the long-standing problem of under-funding indigent defense in 
particular jurisdictions. 
C. Anticipating Objections to a Higher Standard of Proof 
While a proposal to raise the standard of proof to convict indigent 
defendants is constitutional, there are serious objections that can be raised. 
First, as Professor Erik Lillquist recently has argued in the context of 
death-penalty cases, there is reason to believe that "the existing reasonable 
doubt jury instructions have almost no impact on juror's [sic] decision-
making."157 Studies demonstrate that a substantial percentage of jurors 
already wrongly perceive a higher standard of proof than the reasonable 
doubt standard requires. 158 By contrast, other jurors mistakenly apply a 
lower standard of proof-even after being read the reasonable doubt 
instruction. 159 More alarmingly, studies demonstrate that jurors might be 
less likely to ·convict under the lower clear and convincing standard of 
proof than under the reasonable doubt formulation. 160 And still more social 
science research demonstrates that jurors simply do not understand 
substantial portions of what they are being told at all. 161 Moreover, when 
156 See, e.g., City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 505-09 (1989) (holding that a 
governmental plan was not narrowly tailored to remedy discrimination because the existence of past 
discrimination was unclear); United States v. Paradise, 480 U.S. 149, 166 (1987) ("It is now well 
established that government bodies, including courts, may constitutionally employ racial classifications 
essential to remedy unlawful treatment of racial or ethnic groups subject to discrimination."); see also 
Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. I, 15 (1971) (authorizing busing to remedy 
discrimination by explaining that "[ o]nce a right and a violation have been shown, the scope of a 
district court's equitable powers to remedy past wrongs is broad"). 
157 Lillquist, Absolute, supra note 141, at 47,78-84. 
158 See, e.g., Geoffrey P. Kramer & Dorean M. Koenig, Do Jurors Understand Criminal Jury 
Instructions? Analyzing the Results of the Michigan Juror Comprehension Project, 23 U. MICH. J.L. 
REF. 401, 402, 414 (1990) (studying 600 actual jurors and finding that a majority of "uninstructed 
jurors revealed a belief that any doubt (or, alternatively, anything less than 100% certainty) is 
equivalent to reasonable doubt. Reasonable doubt instructions apparently did little to improve jurors' 
understanding that absolute certainty is not required") (citation omitted). 
159 See Bradley Saxton, How Well Do Jurors Understand Jury Instructions? A Field Test Using 
Real Juries and Real Trials in Wyoming, 33 LAND & WATER L. REV. 59,98 fig.13 (1998) (finding that 
nearly I 0% of recent criminal jurors believed the burden of proof on prosecutors was "more likely than 
not" and that another 6% were "not sure" whether that was the correct standard of proof). 
160 See Dorothy K. Kagehiro & W. Clark Stanton, Legal vs. Quantified Definitions of Standards of 
Proof, 9 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 159, 162, 165 (1985) (finding, inter alia, that California jury 
instructions led sample jurors to convict more easily under the reasonable doubt standard than the clear 
and convincing evidence standard); L.S.E. Jury Project, Juries and the Rules of Evidence, 1973 CRIM. 
L. REv. 208, 218-19 (finding the same phenomenon present with a "balance of probabilities" standard 
vis-a-vis reasonable doubt). 
161 See, e.g., AMIRAM ELWORK ET AL., MAKING JURY INSTRUCfiONS UNDERSTANDABLE 12 
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we consider that jurors come to court with preconceived notions based on 
what they have read in the newspaper or watched on "Law and Order," a 
"beyond all doubt" instruction would have a lot of baggage to overcome. 162 
Accordingly, critics have some basis to contend that imposing a higher 
standard of proof might have limited effect. 163 
However, while the social science research is startling, it does not 
demonstrate that a "beyond all doubt" instruction would be ineffective. 
Indeed, any competent defense lawyer would harp on the instruction 
during her closing argument and point out that it is higher than the 
traditional reasonable doubt standard. 164 As even a skeptical observer has 
conceded, "the very novelty of the no-doubt standard will make it more 
salient and thus perhaps more likely to be heard and/or understood by the 
jurors."165 
Assuming that a higher standard of proof would have an effect on 
jurors' decisions, critics could next complain that the standard will result in 
setting free more guilty defendants. 166 There is some merit to this 
objection because freeing the guilty carries a high cost. 167 If the higher 
standard of proof resulted in droves of guilty defendants going free and 
only a handful of innocent defendants (who would otherwise have been 
(1982) (concluding that jurors in some states understand only about half of the legal instructions 
presented by a judge); Phoebe C. Ellsworth, Are Twelve Heads Better Than One, 52 LAW & CONTEMP. 
PROBS. 205,219 (1989) (determining that jurors understood about half of the instructions they received 
at trial); Alan Reifman eta!., Real Jurors' Understanding of the Law in Real Cases, 16 LAW & HUM. 
BEHAV. 539 (1992) (same); Lawrence J. Severance & Elizabeth F. Loftus, Improving the Ability of 
Jurors to Comprehend and Apply Criminal Jury Instructions, 17 LAW & SOC'Y REV. 153, 179-81 
(1982) (evaluating jurors' comprehension-levels when given no instructions, general instructions and 
specific instructions); see also Lillquist, supra note 145, at 112-17 (discussing sources demonstrating 
that jurors do not perceive reasonable doubt to be a "high, fixed standard"). 
162 See Lillquist, supra note 141, at 82 (noting that jurors "connect to the courtroom with their 
own preconceptions about what the standard of proof in criminal case should be ... "). 
163 See id. at 47 (contending that a higher burden of proof would have "little or no effect in real 
world cases"). But see Norbert L. Kerr et a!., Guilt Beyond a Reasonable Doubt: Effects of Concept 
Definition and Assigned Decision Rule on the Judgments of Mock Jurors, 34 J. PERSONALITY & Soc. 
PSYCHOL. 282, 291 (1976) (studying mock jurors and finding that a less rigorous description of 
reasonable doubt led to higher conviction rates, while a more stringent definition of reasonable doubt 
led to fewer convictions). 
164 The very premise of this Article casts some doubt on this point, however, because we cannot 
assume that unimpressive or over-worked appointed attorneys will do an adequate job during closing 
arguments. See Lillquist, Absolute, supra note 141, at 80 n.J38 (noting that attorneys are motivated to 
emphasize instructions that favor their clients and that incompetence plays a role in closing arguments). 
The counter-argument is that even the worst criminal defense attorneys can point out that the standard 
of proof is the very high "beyond all doubt" standard. 
165 /d. at 84 n.153. 
166 Cf In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 371 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring) ("If, for example, the 
standard of proof for a criminal trial were a preponderance of the evidence rather than proof beyond a 
reasonable doubt, there would be a smaller risk of factual errors that result in freeing guilty persons, but 
a far greater risk of factual errors that result in convicting the innocent."). 
167 See Lillquist, Absolute, supra note 141, at 66 ("Advocates who wish to justify a higher 
standard of proof [in capital cases] ... need to be clearer about why the harms are so much higher in 
capital cases that they justify a much higher standard of proof."). 
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convicted) being exonerated, the benefits might not outweigh the costs. 
Yet, the calculus is difficult to analyze because there is no data on the 
number of guilty defendants who would go free under a beyond all doubt 
standard, nor on the number of innocent defendants who would be saved 
from wrongful convictions. 
However, if the social science evidence discussed above is to be 
believed, the standard of proof, while having some effect on jurors' 
decision-making, may not have a dramatic effect. 168 Accordingly, the 
number of wrongful exonerations may well be low. Conversely, in 
assessing the benefits of the higher standard of proof, we must consider not 
only exonerations linked to the beyond all doubt standard, but also the 
systemic benefits that will result from states opting out of the higher 
burden of proof. As explained below in Part V, the beyond all doubt 
standard would be a default rule that legislatures could opt out of by 
ensuring adequate indigent defense funding. Although it is unclear 
whether the higher standard of proof would make prosecutors' jobs 
dramatically more difficult, that will certainly be the perception by the 
public and by most prosecutors. Accordingly, legislatures will be under 
pressure to opt out of the rule by properly funding their indigent defense 
systems. And by properly funding indigent defense, legislatures will 
improve representation for indigent defendants, thus reducing the risk of 
wrongful convictions, while conferring other benefits on the criminal 
justice system. 169 
Third, critics might ask why indigent defense is special. If a higher 
standard of proof is to be applied in indigent defense cases, then why not in 
capital cases, or complicated securities fraud prosecutions, or cases in 
which there is no eyewitness or no DNA evidence?170 Put simply, why 
should indigent defendants be afforded a more beneficial standard than 
other defendants?171 
There are two possible responses. First, indigent defense systems are 
in such crisis that additional procedural regulation is merited. While 
securities fraud cases might be more complicated or death-penalty cases 
might be more important, those defendants are already protected in other 
168 See supra notes 157-63 and accompanying text (discussing objections to a higher standard of 
proof and empirical evidence of jurors' misunderstanding of the current standard of proof). 
169 By "other benefits" I mean to suggest that there is more at stake than simply convicting the 
guilty and acquitting the innocent. For instance, a properly funded judicial system confers greater 
legitimacy on the conviction and imprisonment of individuals, demonstrating that the United States is 
an advanced democracy that takes criminal defendants' rights seriously. 
170 See Newman, supra note 148, at 998-1000 (arguing for "heightened scrutiny" in cases 
involving eyewitness testimony and uncorroborated testimony of accomplices because of the 
heightened risk of wrongful conviction, not "simply to tilt the balance of criminal justice a shade more 
favorably toward defendants"). 
171 See Lillquist, supra note 141, at 70 (questioning why a higher burden of proof would be 
applicable in capital cases, but not other criminal cases). 
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ways. There are already a myriad of procedures in place in death-penalty 
cases. 172 Defendants in complex white-collar cases are ahead of the game 
because such cases are harder to investigate and prove at trial and because 
such defendants can almost always afford to hire private counsel. 173 By 
contrast, without a higher standard of proof, there is little to protect 
indigent defendants represented by overworked or incompetent 
government-funded lawyers. No defendant can receive adequate 
representation when his lawyer has nearly 200 other open cases and no 
time to devote to preparing a defense. Second, the sheer magnitude of the 
problem merits special attention. Close to eighty percent of criminal 
defendants are indigent. 174 In jurisdictions where indigent representation is 
in crisis, that means that up to four out of five defendants are being denied 
a fair shake. Such terrible numbers merit additional attention from the 
judiciary. 
Finally, critics might complain that imposing a higher standard of 
proof would not address the core problem with the under-funding of 
indigent defense, because the vast majority of criminal cases are plea 
bargained and never proceed to trial where the standard of proof would 
matter. This objection is without merit, however, because imposing a 
"beyond all doubt" standard of proof would change the parameters of the 
plea bargaining process. Defendants who are alerted to the heightened 
standard of proof will be more likely to expect exoneration at trial and 
therefore less likely to plea bargain. 175 A higher standard of proof 
therefore would force prosecutors to offer more favorable plea bargains or 
to take more cases to trial. Accordingly, the heightened standard of proof 
would have a significant systemic impact. As explained below, that impact 
would spur improvement in indigent defense funding. 176 
172 Of course, scholars have argued convincingly that the extra procedural rules in death-penalty 
cases offer little actual protection to defendants. See Carol S. Steiker & Jordan M. Steiker, Sober 
Second Thoughts: Reflections on Two Decades of Constitutional Regulation of Capital Punishment, 
109 HARV. L. REv. 355, 360 (1995) ("the [Supreme] Court's chosen path of death penalty 
regulation ... creates an impression of enormous regulatory effort but achieves negligible regulatory 
effects."). 
173 See JEROLD H. ISRAEL ET AL., WHITE COLLAR CRIME: LAW AND PRACTICE 9 (2d ed. 2003) 
("The white collar crime defense attorney, in contrast, enters the picture substantially before the 
government has completed its investigation and sometimes before the investigation has even begun ... 
Counsel's first line of defense accordingly is 'information control,' which entails keeping documents 
away from and preventing clients and witnesses from talking to government investigators, prosecutors, 
and judges." (citing KENNETH MANN, DEFENDING WHITE-COLLAR CRIME: A PoRTRAIT OF 
ATTORNEYS AT WORK (1983))). 
174 See Pamela S. Karlan, Fee Shifting in Criminal Cases, 71 CH!.-KENTL. REv. 583,583 (1995-
1996) ("Estimates of the percentage of criminal defendants represented by appointed counsel . . . 
generally hover around seventy-five to eighty percent."). 
175 See Bibas, supra note 77, at 2499 ("If one side overestimates the chances of winning at trial, it 
is like!~ to make unreasonable settlement offers and to reject reasonable offers."). 
1 6 See infra Part V.C. 
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V. THE DEFAULT RULE SOLUTION 
Having argued in favor of raising the standard of proof to deal with the 
crisis in indigent defense funding, it is prudent to leave a wide escape hatch 
that encourages the legislatures to opt out of the judicial remedy. Courts 
have made clear that they do not want to be in the business of supervising 
indigent defense systems or ordering particular sums of money to be spent, 
and legislatures no doubt agree. 177 Whenever possible, it is preferable to 
encourage legislators to take a policyrnaking rule, rather than relying on 
courts. Accordingly, designing a default rule that allows legislatures to 
control their destiny by opting out of the "beyond all doubt" standard of 
proof is preferable. 
A. Two Options for Opting Out of the Higher Standard of Proof 
The default rule would operate as follows. In the frrst indigent defense 
case of the calendar year, a state court, upon motion by the defendant, 
would consider whether the indigent defense system is unconstitutionally 
under-funded. 178 If the court were to find the system to be under-funded, it 
then would impose a remedy whereby all indigent defendants could be 
convicted only upon proof beyond all doubt. Assuming that the trial 
court's decision were upheld on appeal, legislatures thereafter would have 
the option to opt out of the higher standard of proof by demonstrating 
either that: (1) the caseloads of government-funded defense lawyers do not 
exceed the recommended guideposts set by the National Advisory 
Commission on Criminal Justice Standards and Goals, or (2) the funds 
appropriated for indigent defense are equal to the funds appropriated for 
prosecutors' offices. 
1. Keeping Caseloads Under Control 
The National Advisory Commission on Criminal Justice Standards and 
Goals has recommended that defense counsel not handle more than 150 
111 See Wright, supra note 9, at 252 ("Courts also shy away from remedies that dictate to the 
legislature a method of addressing a legal violation, particularly when they require the legislature to 
appropriate public money."). Professor Stuntz has argued that if the judiciary ordered money to be 
spent on indigent defense "(n)o judicial micromanagement would be necessary." Stuntz, supra note 8, 
at 70. Courts and legislatures do not appear to agree, however. 
178 An alternative, though less attractive, approach would be for a criminal defendant to file a civil 
action seeking a declaration that the indigent defense system is unconstitutionally under-funded and 
requesting that the standard of proof be raised to remedy the problem. Such an approach would be 
similar to the continuing structural injunctions issued in cases involving school desegregation and 
prison conditions. See, e.g., Schlanger, supra note 17, at 552-53 (discussing injunctions and 
desegregation). The declaratory judgment route is less attractive because it is at least one-step removed 
from the criminal case. First, overworked public defenders and appointed lawyers are less likely to 
take the added step of filing a separate civil action. Second, civil actions are more likely to become 
bogged down in time-consuming discovery, thus delaying prompt improvements. Third, a civil action 
will often be heard by a judge that does not handle many (or even any) criminal cases, thus creating a 
steep and time-consuming learning curve for the court. 
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felony cases or 400 misdemeanor cases per year. 179 This guidepost is 
widely accepted and has been endorsed by the National Legal Aid 
Defender Association and cited approvingly by the American Bar 
Association. 180 
To bring caseloads within the National Advisory Commission's 
guideposts, legislatures would have a number of options. They could 
appropriate more funding, thus making it possible for public defender 
offices to hire adequate staff as well as enabling courts to pay higher rates 
that would attract greater numbers of appointed counsel. Another 
possibility would be for legislatures to keep indigent defense funding static 
while providing incentives for prosecutors to reduce the number of 
criminal charges they bring, thus reducing defense caseloads. 
Alternatively, legislatures could decriminalize high volume offenses (such 
as drug possession), which would reduce the number of criminal cases and, 
in tum, the need for defense counsel. In a political world that prizes being 
tough on crime, these latter solutions seem implausible. In all likelihood, 
caseload guideposts with some teeth would encourage legislatures to 
(grudgingly) appropriate more money for indigent defense so that more 
defense lawyers could be hired. 
Once a court has tied the standard of proof to caseload limits, the next 
problem becomes ensuring that there is compliance with the guideposts. 
The judiciary has neither the time, the resources, nor the ability to 
adequately analyze entire indigent defense systems on a regular basis. And 
courts will not want to be in the business of holding numerous fact-finding 
hearings to determine whether lawyers are actually following the caseload 
guideposts. Fortunately, many states already have organizations with the 
time and expertise to review defense lawyers' caseloads: indigent defense 
commissions. 
More than three-quarters of the states have created commissions or 
boards to recommend best practices for the defense of the poor. 181 The 
members of the indigent defense commissions are typically appointed by 
the Governor, the state supreme court, and the legislature, and they come 
from a wide array of the community, including the judiciary, the executive 
branch, the criminal defense bar, and sometimes the business world. 182 
179 NAT'L ADVISORY COMM'N ON CRIMINAL JUSTICE STANDARDS & GOALS, supra note 34, at 
Standard 13 .12. 
180 See supra notes 35-36 and accompanying text. While the National Advisory Commission 
caseload standards are widely cited, they are far from perfect. They do not appear to have been derived 
from any empirical formula, and instead approximate a "best guess" of what reasonable caseloads 
should be. Nevertheless, in the absence of more authoritative standards, I rely on them as the best 
existing source. 
181 See generally THE SPANGENBERG GROUP, STATEWIDE INDIGENT DEFENSE SYSTEMS: 2005 
(2005) (describing the commissions' makeup and responsibilities). For jurisdictions without indigent 
defense commissions, the default rule would provide a strong incentive to establish such commissions. 
182 /d. 
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Although many of the commissions lack the budget to effect much change, 
some of them do succeed in improving funding, reducing caseloads, and 
creating standards for indigent defense. There is near universal consensus 
that such indigent defense commissions are a force for good. 183 
Accordingly, they would be well-suited to making an objective 
determination whether caseloads are in compliance with the National 
Advisory Commission guidelines, filling a role akin to a special master. 184 
Here is how the commission would work. During the year, the 
commission could study caseload compliance and then-perhaps on the 
anniversary of the court's decision finding the indigent defense system to 
be under-funded-the commission could certify in writing whether there 
has been compliance with the caseload limits. If there has been 
compliance, the court would then return the standard of proof to the 
reasonable doubt standard, where it would remain for the next year. The 
commission would then repeat its inquiry the following year, and report to 
the court again. Should the commission find that the jurisdiction has fallen 
out of compliance with the caseload standards, the court would then re-
instate the higher standard of proof, which would remain intact until 
another year had expired. 185 
2. Funding Parity 
In addition to caseload compliance, courts could establish funding 
parity as a method to opt out of the higher burden of proof. Put simply, if 
legislatures provide the same funding for indigent defense counsel that 
they do for prosecutors, then the higher burden of proof can be 
eliminated. 186 Yet, for funding parity, the devil is in the details. 
Legislatures do not simply appropriate $100 million for prosecutors and 
$70 million for indigent defense and call it a day. Rather, the 
investigation, prosecution, and defense of criminal activity are funded in a 
host of manners through numerous budget lines. Money is appropriated 
183 See Malia Brink, Indigent Defense, CHAMPION, May 2005, at *30, *31, available at Lexis, 
News Library, CHAMP File (explaining that indigent defense commissions serve to establish eligibility 
and qualification requirements, attorney performance standards, while managing the indigent defense 
system). 
184 See Effectively Ineffective, supra note 12, at 1750 (suggesting that courts appoint special 
masters to order funding and review caseloads). 
185 One downside of relying on a numerical measurement such as caseloads is that it can be 
manipulated through other outlets. For example, judges who want to leave the conventional standard of 
proof intact might be more aggressive in asking defendants if they want to waive their right to counsel. 
In the alternative, judges might be more rigorous in ensuring that defendants meet the statutory 
definition of indigency before appointing free lawyers. See Gershowitz, supra note 151, at 583-84 
(discussing the extremely low-income levels statutorily required for the appointment of a free lawyer in 
many states). I am grateful to Ron Wright for raising these points. 
186 See Stuntz, supra note 8, at 70-71 ("Unlike prison cases, testing compliance with judicial 
decrees [to provide funding for defense lawyers] would seem to be easy: Either the required 
appropriations were made or they weren't."). 
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not only for prosecution and public defender offices, but also for police 
departments, crime labs, appointed counsel, and sheriff's departments. 
And to make matters more complicated, many jurisdictions receive 
supplemental funding from federal, state, and local governments. 
Moreover, prosecutors and defense lawyers are not in identical 
postures. Prosecutors must handle all criminal activity, whereas public 
defenders or appointed counsel deal only with the roughly eighty percent 
of criminal defendants who cannot afford private lawyers. 187 In that 
respect, there is a need for greater funding for prosecutors. At the same 
time however, it is prosecutors, not government-funded defense lawyers, 
who are likely to benefit from extra budget lines such as the separate 
funding of police (who pursue leads for prosecutors) 188 and crime labs, 
which not only investigate but also provide crucial trial support to 
prosecutors in the form of testifying witnesses and expert reports. 189 
Moreover, it is prosecutors, not defense lawyers, who are likely to receive 
additional funding from federal, state or local governments. 190 
In the end, the best we can hope to achieve is rough parity, whereby 
the extra cases handled by prosecutors (but not government-funded defense 
lawyers) are offset by the extra resources that prosecutors receive from 
separate budget lines. As such, and once again in the interest of simplicity, 
parity should entail equal funding between prosecutors' offices on the one 
187 HARLOW, supra note 25, at I. 
188 While prosecutors benefit from investigative work conducted by police agencies, it would be a 
gross overstatement to suggest that prosecutors have control over those agencies. For an analysis of the 
complexity of these relationships, see Daniel Richman, Prosecutors and Their Agents, Agents and 
Their Prosecutors, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 749, 751-53 (2003). 
189 See Douglas W. Vick, Poorhouse Justice: UnderfUnded Indigent Defense Services and 
Arbitrary Death Sentences, 43 BUFF. L. REv. 329, 395 (1995) ("Funding for the support services 
essential to the preparation of the prosecutor's case--police investigation, FBI and local crime labs, 
and state and local forensic experts--does not come out of the budget for the prosecutor's office, while 
analogous expenses by the defense must be paid out of the money provided for defense services."). 
190 See GIDEON'S BROKEN PROMISE, supra note 5, at 42 ("[V]irtually no federal funds are 
allocated for defense services in the fifty states."); CAROL DEFRANCES, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, 
PROSECUTORS IN STATE COURTS 4 (2001) ("Over a third of the [prosecutors] offices indicated that 
some portion of their budget came from grant funds."); IN DEFENSE OF PUBLIC ACCESS TO JUSTICE, 
supra note 26, at 54 (explaining that a Louisiana prosecutor's office funded an "$850,000 renovation, 
including all new computers with high-speed internet access" primarily through federal grants, whereas 
the indigent defense office received no comparable funding and was in "disarray"); VIRGINIA REPORT, 
supra note 4, at 35 (noting that "[m]any Commonwealth's attorney offices receive supplemental funds 
from local governments ... " whereas "just two public defender offices in the state receive local 
support"); Wallace, supra note 4, at 17 ("Congress appropriated $100 million for fiscal year 2001 to 
allow states to hire 'community prosecutors.' Though the amounts of proposed federal support are 
very substantial, the proposals never include matching funds for the constitutionally mandated 
provision of legal representation services in the new cases which will be filed by the new 
prosecutors."). To make up for the lack of funding for indigent defense, many jurisdictions have turned 
to recoupment and application fees that require indigent defendants to fund their appointed lawyers, at 
least in part, either before or after their cases are resolved. See Ronald F. Wright & Wayne A. Logan, 
The Political Economy of Application Fees for Indigent Criminal Defense, 47 WM. & MARY L. REV. 
2045, 2047 (2006) (explaining that, often against the will of their members, defense organizations, 
support recoupment and application fees out of budgetary and political necessity). 
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hand and the amount spent on public defenders' offices and appointed 
counsel on the other hand. 191 At the granular level, this should mean 
identical salaries for public defenders and district attorneys. At the macro 
level, it should mean identical appropriations for prosecution funding and 
defense funding. 192 
B. Would the Legislature Opt Out of the Default Rule? 
A default rule that raises the standard of proof in the absence of 
legislative action will create a vastly better incentive structure than prior 
judicial decisions that have attempted to improve indigent defense on a 
case-by-case basis. Prosecutors will see the beyond all doubt standard of 
proof as a threat to their ability to attain convictions, and they will pressure 
legislators to take whatever steps are necessary to eliminate the higher 
standard of proof. And even in the absence of such pressure, legislatures 
acting out of self-interest will want to take credit for removing an 
undesirable legal rule that will hinder the incarceration of criminals. 
1. Prosecutors ' Incentives to Lobby for Opting Out of the Default Rule 
First and quite simply, no litigator wants to lose. 193 Prosecutors, 
perhaps even more so than civil litigators, are aggressive lawyers who 
value their reputations, believe in their cause, and want to win. 194 
Prosecutors will likely view a higher standard of proof in eighty percent of 
their cases as unfairly stacking the deck against them. Thus, in the abstract 
alone, prosecutors likely will lobby the legislature to remove what they see 
as an injustice. 
More importantly, the incentive for prosecutors to lobby the legislature 
goes beyond mere philosophical objections. Most district attorneys are 
elected and must answer to the voters. 195 In their re-election campaigns, 
prosecutors often stress their conviction rates and highlight their high-
191 Although the goal is bright-line rules, courts will have to dig into at least some of the details to 
ensure that legislatures are not playing games with the budget to make it falsely appear that defense 
funding is equal to prosecutorial funding. 
191 Identical funding would be easier to accomplish from a logistical standpoint if all jurisdictions 
used public defenders to provide indigent defense, because legislatures could then simply provide equal 
funding for both prosecutor and defense offices. However, a substantial number of jurisdictions assign 
appointed counsel on an individual basis in lieu of public defender offices. See Robert L. Spangenberg 
& Marea L. Beeman, Indigent Defense Systems in the United States, 58 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS . 31, 
31 (1995) (noting that some states have public defender programs and others rely on the bar for 
acceptance of court appointments). And given that demographics and traditions vary by jurisdiction, a 
one-size fits all public defender approach might not be the best option for all jurisdictions. 
193 Stuntz, supra note 19, at 534. 
194 See Bibas, supra note 77, at 2472 ("Prosecutors are particularly concerned about their 
reputations ... [and] [l)osses at trial hurt prosecutors' public images."). 
195 See CAROL DEFRANCES & GREG W. STEADMAN, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, PROSECUTORS IN 
STA'ffi COURTS 1 (1996) (explaining that more than 95% of chief prosecutors are elected). 
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profile prosecutions. I% Voters respond well to such posturing, 
demonstrating that their prime desire is for convictions and punishment. 197 
A higher standard of proof endangers prosecutors' grandstanding because 
convictions will be harder to come by. Not only will it be harder to prove 
defendants guilty "beyond all doubt" at trial, but defendants who are 
alerted to the heightened standard of proof will be more likely to expect 
exoneration at trial and therefore less likely to plea bargain. 198 Because 
ninety-five percent of defendants plea bargain under the current system, 
any significant reduction will have serious repercussions. 199 Fewer guilty 
pleas will force prosecutors to bring more cases to trial, further diffusing 
already limited resources and thus making it harder to prevail at trial. 200 In 
the alternative, prosecutors would have to dismiss more charges, or offer 
defendants better plea deals to entice them to abandon the hopes for 
success at trial that they developed as a result of the higher standard of 
proof.20I 
Put simply, the result of a higher standard of proof likely will be more 
losses at trial, an increased number of voluntary dismissals, and fewer 
favorable plea bargains. That translates into less grandstanding and more 
negative publicity about dangerous criminals beating the rap, which in turn 
endangers prosecutors' re-election prospects. Accordingly, prosecutors 
will either need to work much harder to overcome the obstacles created by 
the higher standard of proof or, more likely, they will lobby to have the 
offending rule removed. 202 
And when prosecutors lobby to remove the higher standard of proof, 
legislatures are likely to listen. First, legislatures are inclined to give 
196 See Ken Armstrong & Maurice Possley, Break Rules, Be Promoted, CHI-TRffiUNE, Jan. 14, 
1999 at Nl, available at LEXIS, News Library, CHTRIB File ("[P]rosecutors recite conviction rates 
like bol\ers touting won-loss records .... "). 
197 See Stuntz, supra note 19, at 533-34. 
198 See supra note 175 and accompanying tellt. 
199 Stephanos Bibas, Regulating Local Variations in Federal Sentencing, 58 STAN. L. REV. 137, 
145 (2005). 
200 See Robert E. Scott & William J. Stuntz, Plea Bargaining as Contract, 101 YALE L.J. 1909, 
1941 (1992) ("[A]djudication costs are both high and disproportionately allocated to prosecutors. 
Prosecutors bear the burden of proof and therefore must invest more in digging out and presenting 
evidence."). Indeed, as Professor Stuntz has observed, docket and funding pressures already result in 
"prosecutors in most jurisdictions hav[ing] more cases than they have time to handle .... " William J. 
Stuntz, Plea Bargaining and Criminal Law's Disappearing Shadow, 117 HARV. L. REv. 2548, 2555 
(2004). 
201 See Bibas, supra note 77, at 2473-75 (arguing that caseloads and many factors other than the 
strength of the evidence affect the amount and the generosity of plea bargains); Frank 0. Bowman m 
& Michael Heise, Quiet Rebellion II: An Empirical Analysis of Declining Federal Drug Sentences 
Including Data from the District Level, 87 IOWA L. REv. 477, 544 (2002) (ellamining national drug 
sentencing statistics and concluding, inter alia, that "increased [Assistant United States Attorney] 
caseload correlated with decreased average drug sentence[s]"). 
202 See Stuntz, supra note 19, at 537-38 (ellplaining that prosecutors lobby for legislation that 
"makes it cheaper for prosecutors to do their job"). 
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prosecutors what they want because their interests are aligned.203 Just like 
prosecutors, legislators want to highlight convictions and punishment that 
occurred on their watch. Second, legislators will listen to district 
attorneys' demands because they will fear the consequences. Prosecutors 
frequently seek higher office, and the failure of legislators to eliminate 
obstacles to convicting defendants will provide a good campaign issue for 
the district attorneys. 204 
2. Legislators' Independent Incentives to Opt Out 
Even without lobbying by prosecutors, legislators will independently 
desire to eliminate the higher standard of proof. Because voters do not 
have a nuanced view of the intricacies of criminal law and procedure, they 
look to high-profile cases or prominent and comprehensible criminal 
procedure rules to assess the state of criminal justice. 205 When bad news 
occurs-usually in the form of high-profile crimes-the voters demand 
action. In response, politicians signal their bona fides through tough-on-
crime rhetoric and symbolic legislation. 206 As Professor Bill Stuntz has 
explained, the legislative response usually takes the form of creating new 
crimes "to give voters the sense that they are doing something about it."207 
There is every reason to believe this general paradigm will apply to a 
default rule raising the standard of proof. While voters might not 
understand the nuances of judicial decisions affecting the federal 
sentencing guidelines or procedural default rules for habeas corpus 
proceedings, they will understand headlines trumpeting "Court Raises 
Standard of Proof in Most Crimirlal Cases to 'Beyond All Doubt' But 
Invites Legislature To Intervene." It is not difficult to predict the public's 
response. Most voters will equate a higher standard of proof with more 
criminals going free and escaping punishment, the exact opposite of their 
preference for more convictions. 
203 See id. at 534 ("If police and prosecutors want some new criminal prohibition, they likely want 
it because it would advance their goals. Advancing police and prosecutors' goals usually means 
advancing legislators' goals as well.") . But see Wright & Logan, supra note 190, at 2069 (explaining 
that there are "more complex settings" in which the interests of prosecutors and legislators are not 
aligned). With respect to a higher burden of proof, there is little question that prosecutors and 
legislators would be unified in their opposition. 
204 Think of Arlen Specter, John Cornyn, Elliot Spitzer and Rudolph Guliani, to name just a few 
prominent examples. See Bibas, Plea Bargaining, supra note 77, at 2472 (collecting additional 
examgles). 
05 See Rachel E. Barkow, Administering Crime, 52 UCLA L. REv. 715, 748-49 (2005) 
("Cognitive psychology teaches that when voters think of crime and sentencing, they tend to think of 
examples of crimes that are most salient. Because most voters have no direct experience with crime, 
their impressions are formed largely from the media.") (citations omitted}. For a detailed analysis of 
the reasons behind public misperception of crime, see Sara Sun Beale, What's Law Gotto Do With It? 
The Political, Social, Psychological and Other Non-Legal Factors Influencing the Development of 
(Federal) Criminal Law, I BUFF. CRIM . L. REV. 23 (1997). 
206 See Stuntz., supra note 19, at 53 I (noting the legislature's goal of taking symbolic stands). 
207 /d. at 532. 
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Responding to public opinion, legislatures will move quickly to opt out 
of the beyond all doubt rule. Legislatures would be more than happy to 
enact a symbolic statute that returns the standard of proof to the traditional 
reasonable doubt formulation. They could name it the "Restoring Justice 
Act" or the "Lower Burden of Proof Act" and reap political dividends. 208 
Moreover, the political costs209 of enacting the statute-funding parity with 
prosecutors' offices or caseloads conforming to National Advisory 
Commission standards-are minimal because the public is unlikely to be 
outraged by the prosrcect of equal funding for indigent defense or 
manageable caseloads.2 0 
Additionally, legislatures will be likely to opt out of the higher 
standard of proof because, practically speaking, it will be easy to do so. 
The default rule offers only two legislative options for eliminating the 
higher standard of proof: funding parity or compliance with caseloads 
guideposts. With only two approaches, legislators should find it easy to 
draft the legislation. 
C. A Solution That Avoids Prior Pitfalls 
After so many unsuccessful efforts to improve indigent defense, the 
final question should be: why is this proposal likely to succeed where 
others have failed? The reason is that, unlike other efforts, the judiciary's 
involvement is limited while the incentives for the legislature to act are 
more direct and more pronounced. 
Imposing a higher standard of proof to convict indigent defendants is a 
bright-line rule that eliminates any need for the judiciary to look case-by-
case at each defendant. Every indigent defendant will be subjected to the 
higher standard of proof in the absence of legislative action-no 
exceptions. Accordingly, unlike the Peart decision in Louisiana-which 
saddled trial judges with case-by-case responsibility to determine whether 
the presumption of ineffectiveness had been surmounted211-trial judges' 
lOll Consider the "bipartisan acclaim" that legislators enjoyed after enacting the Religious Freedom 
Restoration Act in response to the Supreme Court' s unpopular free-exercise decision in Employment 
Division v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990). Christopher L. Eisgruber & Lawrence G. Sager, Why the 
Religious Freedom Restoration Act is Unconstitutional, 69 N.Y.U. L . REv. 437,438-39 (1994). 
209 See, e.g ., NAT'L LEGAL AID & DEFENDER ASS'N, DEVELOPING A NATIONAL MESSAGE FOR 
INDIGENT DEFENSE: ANALYSIS OF NATIONAL SURVEY 5 (2001) (finding that a majority of the public 
believes indigent defendants should receive a free "lawyer with a small enough caseload to provide the 
time necessary to prepare a defense for each person") . 
210 Of course, the public will be outraged if the increased funding for indigent defense results in 
less funding for education, healthcare, and environmental protections. See Brown, supra note 45, at 
809 ("Even legislators who concede indigent defense is worthy and important must still rank its priority 
for marginal budget dollars relative to funds for medical care for the poor, foster care services, 
improvement of substandard schools, or toxic clean-up of grave environmental health risks."). 
211 The Peart rule further taxed busy trial courts by forcing them to have "Peart hearings" to 
assess whether the individual lawyer in the case at bar could provide effective representation. See IN 
DEFENSE OF PuBuc ACCESS TO JUSTICE, supra note 26, at 3 n.9 (noting that "there is a significant 
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hands will be tied unless the legislature acts. With all responsibility 
channeled to the legislature, it will not be able to punt its obligations to 
trial judges and will instead have no choice but to improve funding or take 
responsibility for the higher standard of proof associated with its 
inaction.212 
Moreover, while the higher standard of proof imposes direct pressure 
on the legislature, it does not embroil the judiciary in time-consuming and 
cumbersome supervision that is so often associated with structural reform 
litigation. While judicial monitoring of indigent defense will continue 
each year, the judiciary's responsibilities will be minimal. Once per year, 
the state court will review the indigent defense commission's analysis of 
caseload compliance or the legislature's budget to see whether there is 
funding parity. If everything is in order, the court will impose the 
reasonable doubt standard until the following year. If caseloads are 
excessive or the legislature has failed to provide funding parity, then the 
court will increase the standard of proof to "beyond all doubt" and invite 
the legislature to do better the following year. Regardless of which 
standard of proof the court imposes, its work will be complete until the 
following year. Constant, vigilant oversight will not be necessary. Rather, 
the vast amount of planning, thinking, and policymaking will remain with 
the legislature-exactly where it belongs. Such an approach maximizes 
institutional competence. 
Furthermore, at the same time that the judiciary's involvement will be 
minimal, the framework stands a much better chance of success than prior 
efforts. In the handful of prior cases where lawyers successfully have 
challenged the under-funding of indigent defense, the benefits stemming 
from the litigation have been temporary. 213 After successful litigation, 
legislatures typically respond promptly by appropriating more funding, but 
in subsequent years the legislatures take no action, allowing salaries to 
remain stagnant while caseloads climb.214 Put simply, the public attention 
number of Peart motions being litigated across the state"). Yet, because trial judges are under pressure 
to keep their dockets moving and to see that guilty defendants are convicted, the Peart rule has caused 
more headaches, rather than enabling trial judges to affect systemic change. Accordingly, today 
Louisiana in general, and New Orleans in particular, are among the nation's most under-funded 
indigent defense systems. See supra notes 120-23 and accompanying text. 
212 There is a large body of psychological literature demonstrating that when responsibility is 
diffused individuals are less likely to take socially responsible actions. See, e.g., Bibb Latane & Steve 
Nida, Ten Years of Research on Group Size and Helping, 89 PSYCHOL. BULL. 308 (1981) (noting that 
presence of other persons inhibits the impulse to help). Accordingly, a rule that channels responsibility 
to the correct actor-here, the legislature--is preferable. 
213 See supra Parts Ill.B and III.C. 
214 See Wright, supra note 9, at 249 (explaining that "[a]fter a judge orders or convinces the state 
or local government to fund indigent defense at prevailing rates for the time, the world moves on. 
Inflation immediately starts eroding salaries of the attorneys and greater numbers of arrests and charges 
erode the gains in caseload. Over time, the old difficulties for defense attorneys return.") (citation 
omitted). 
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and pressure wrought by the litigation are temporary, and once they 
disappear so does the legislatures' incentives to provide adequate funding. 
By contrast, because the proposal advocated in this article imposes annual 
monitoring, it is less likely that funding will stagnate while caseloads creep 
upward. Each year, the legislature must provide funding parity or 
convince the indigent defense commission that caseloads are within 
accepted guidelines. Failure to do so will result in a higher standard of 
proof that will be unpopular not just with prosecutors but the public at 
large. Put simply, unlike the failed prior decisions, this proposal calls for 
the legislature to be under pressure, year-after-year, to maintain adequate 
funding. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
Indigent defense in America is in crisis. While prior reform efforts 
have been valiant, they unfortunately have been unsuccessful. For the 
most part, courts have been unwilling to inject themselves into legislative 
budget decisions. When courts have become involved and have issued 
favorable decisions, the benefits have been only temporary because once 
the pressure of litigation disappeared so did the legislatures' desire to 
appropriate more funding. A successful approach to improving indigent 
defense must assuage courts' concerns about micro-managing budget 
decisions, while simultaneously imposing continuous pressure on 
legislatures to ensure proper funding. By imposing a higher standard of 
proof as a default rule, courts can create an incentive for legislatures to opt 
out by properly funding their indigent defense systems. And by limiting 
the ability to opt out to bright-line annual benchmarks, courts can ensure 
that improvements will not dissipate in subsequent years. 
